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Case Comments
Robinson-Patman Act: Intermediary
May Assert Functional Discount Defense
To Avoid Section 2(c)'s "Brokerage" Proviso
Respondent, doing business as an intermediary between suppliers and wholesalers of food products, was found by a Federal
Trade Commission hearing examiner to have violated section 2(c)
of the Ilobinson-Patman Act by accepting brokerage and discounts in lieu of brokerage on sales for his own account? Respondent purchased goods directly from suppliers and resold
them to wholesalers at his own price. These same suppliers also
sold to wholesalers through brokers, whose sole function was to
procure a wholesale buyer for the suppliers. On sales to respondent
for his own account, suppliers gave him discounts equal to the
brokers' percentage commissions paid on sales to wholesalers. On
appeal the FTC reversed the hearing examiner and held that section 2(c) had not been violated because respondent's discounts
were not "discounts in lieu of brokerage" but "functional discounts," which were permissible since respondent did business on
a higher level of the chain of distribution than did wholesalers.
1.

It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the
course of such commerce, to pay or grant, or to receive or accept,

anything of value as a commission, brokerage, or other compensation, or any allowance or discount in lieu thereof, except for services

rendered in connection with the sale or purchase of goods, wares, or
merchandise, either to the other party to such transaction or to an
agent, representative, or other intermediary therein where such intermediary is acting in fact for or in behalf, or is subject to the direct
or indirect control, of any party to such transaction other than the
person by whom such compensation is so granted or paid.
49 Stat. 1527 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1958), amending Clayton Act § 2,
38 Stat. 780 (1914).
15709 (FTC Jan. 26,
2. Edward Rruby, 1961-1963 TRADEIEG. RP.
1962). Respondent received payments itemized as brokerage from three
of his suppliers. In other transactions, respondent's suppliers invoiced him
at the net price without itemizing brokerage. Upon finding that he was
not a distributor for the suppliers but was buying on his own account and
for his own benefit, the hearing examiner concluded that § 9(c) applied.
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Edward Hruby, 1961-1963 TRADE REG. REP. 16225 (FTC Dec.
26, 1962).
Passed during a period of concern for the economic destruction
of individual entrepreneurs by large chain-stores, the RobinsonPatman Act was designed to permit independent suppliers, wholesalers, and retailers to compete successfully with the giant corporation.' To protect the small independents, the base provision,
section 2(a), prohibits price discrimination by sellers between buyers of the same goods that causes injury to competition and that
4
cannot be justified by differences in the seller's costs.

Section 2(c)'s proscription, directed at a particular business
practice, is much narrower; it prohibits sellers from granting and
buyers from accepting brokerage commissions or discounts in lieu
of brokerage. In doing so, Congress sought to eliminate the practice of some large corporations of hiding direct price concessions,
then forbidden by section 2 of the Clayton Act,5 simply by calling
them "brokerage."" The chain stores, by performing their own
3. S. REP. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1936), reprinted in Rowe,
AcT 580 (1000) [hereinafter cited as Rows]; H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. s (1980),
reprinted in Row 590; see EDWARDS, THE PRIc DiscRimINAToN LAw
29-30 (1959) [hereinafter cited as EDwARDS].
According to one commentator, passage of the act by amendment of the
Clayton Act "was a political masterstroke which invested an anti-chain
store measure with the venerable trappings of antitrust." Rown 23. Underlying the basic economic policy of the bill was an attempt to protect the
small independents at the price of the consumer. It was thought that although the chains could, at that time, market goods to the consumer more
economically, to allow them to destroy independent competition would place
them in a monopoly position whereby they would be potentially harmful.
See generally EDWARDS 12-13; RowE 8-11, 19-23; Fulda, Food Distribution
in the United States, the Struggle Between Independents and Chains, 00
U. PA. L. REv. 1051, 1069-70 (1951).
4. In addition, § 2(b) permits sellers to lower prices to meet competition. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1958). Section 2(f), as
a counterpart to § 2(a), prohibits buyers from knowingly accepting goods
at discriminatory prices. 49 Stat. 1527 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(f) (1958). Sections 2(c), 2(d), and 2(e) do not depend on the relative prices at which
sellers trade; these sections prohibit certain business practices that at the
time of passage of the act, were thought to be used by large corporations
to conceal coerced price discounts. 49 Stat. 1527 (1930), 15 U.S.C. §§ 13(c)(e) (1958).
5. 38 Stat. 730 (1914).
6.
Among the prevalent modes of discrimination at which this bill
is directed, is the practice of certain large buyers to demand the allowance of brokerage direct to them upon their purchases, or its
PRIcE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBiNSON-PATm"

CASE COMMENTS
wholesaling functions, short-circuited the classical chain of distribution from supplier to wholesaler to retailer.7 Suppliers, instead of selling to wholesalers through their brokers, sold to chain
stores, at a lower price, through the store's representatives. Although part of these price discounts reflected genuine savings in
cost to the suppliers, they were, evidently, in part the product of
economic coercion Therefore, in order to abolish the methods by
which this unjustified discount was hidden, Congress prohibited
any payment of brokerage9 or of a discount in lieu of brokerage 0
to the other party in a transaction.
Quickly utilized because of the easy application of its per se
provisions, section 9(c) was literally construed by the courts. The
section was held to be completely independent from section 2(a),
so that one could not defend, as he could under 2(a), by showing
that a discount in lieu of brokerage was the result of bona fide
savings in brokerage costs and not a coerced price concession concealed by the "brokerage label. ' Nor, because of 2(c)'s indepayment to an employee, agent, or corporate subsidiary whom they
set up in the guise of a broker, and through whom they demand that
sales to them be made.
S. REP. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1936), reprinted in RowE 585.
7. For a more complete explanation, see Fulda, aupra note 3, at 1053-09.
See also EDwnns 46-48; Rowe 332-37; Oppenheim, Administration of the
Brokerage Provision of the Robinson-Patmam Act, 8 Guo. WAsH. L. Rsv.

511, 516-20 (1940).
8. This was the conclusion of the FTC, after investigating the chain
stores. See Ewus
10-12. But see Adelman, PriceDiscriminationas Treated

in the Attrney General's Report, 104 U. PA. L. Ruv. 222, 282--33 (1955).
9. Rightly or wrongly, Congress clearly believed that payments of brokerage to the other party in a direct sale were the result of coercion.
[T]he positions of buyer and seller are by nature adverse, and it is
a contradiction in terms incompatible with his natural function for an
intermediary to claim to be rendering services for the seller when he
is acting in fact for or under the control of the buyer, and no seller
can be expected to pay such an intermediary unless compelled to do
so by coercive influences in compromise of his natural interest.
H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1936), reprinted in RowE
604-05.
10. The House version of § 2(c) was directed only at commissions from
sellers to buyers' dummies. The Senate added the "allowance or discount in
lieu thereof" to cover straight price reduction on direct sales. S. RP. No.
1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1936), reprinted in RowE 584.
11. See Great Ati. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 106 Fad 667, 676-77 (3d
Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 US. 625 (1940); Oliver Bros., Inc. v. FTC,
102 F.2d 763, 766-67 (4th Cir. 1939); Biddie Purchasing Co. v. FTC, 96
F-_d 687, 690-91 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 634 (1938); Oppenheim,
supranote 7, at 520-23.
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pendence, was the absence of price differences between buyers in
any given case a barrier to 2(c)'s per se thrust.1 2 To further

broaden 2(c)'s applicability, the courts emasculated its self-contained exception permitting payments "for services rendered" by
interpreting it to apply only to payments by one party to a
broker that he had employed.' Thus construed, the provision has
proved to be a highly effective means of preventing the large corporation from disguising coerced discounts as brokerage. By
therefore prohibiting reductions in price that are accompanied by
reductions in brokerage, however, section 2(c) has perpetuated the
function of the independent broker, for a seller who normally sells
through brokers cannot dispense with them and pass on his cost
savings to a direct buyer.' 4
12. Payments of brokerage or discounts in lieu thereof were forbidden
because of the practice's
tendency to lessen competition and create monopoly, without regard
to their effect in a particular case; and there is no reason to read
into the sections forbidding them the limitations contained in section 2(a) having relation to price discrimination, which is an extremely difficult matter to deal with and is condemned as unfair only
in those cases where it has an effect in suppressing competition or in
tending to create monopoly.
Oliver Bros., Inc. v. FTC, 102 F.2d 763, 767 (4th Cir. 1939).
13. The House Judiciary Committee added to the Senate-passed bill the
exception that brokerage payments were prohibited "except for services rendered in connection with the sale or purchase of goods, wares, or merchandise." The conference report, however, explained the exception in terms
which deprived it of significance:
With the words of the House bill thus retained, this subsection permits the payment of compensation by a seller to his broker or agent
for services actually rendered in his behalf; likewise by a buyer to
his broker or agent for services in connection with the purchase of
goods actually rendered in his behalf; but it prohibits the direct or
indirect payment of brokerage except for such services rendered.
H.R. REPy. No. 2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1936), reprinted in Rows 618.
See Quality Bakers of America v. FTC, 114 F.2d 393, 898-99 (1st Cir.
1940); Webb-Crawford Co. v. FTC, 109 F.2d 268, 270 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 638 (1940); cf. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 106 F.2d
667, 672-73 (3d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 625 (1940); Biddle Purchasing Co. v. FTC, 96 F.2d 687, 691-92 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S.
634 (1938). See also E.DwnARs 47-48; Oppenheim, mupra note 7, at 513 n.3,
517 n.12.
14. This result was most dearly illustrated, among the early cases, by
Southgate Brokerage Co. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1945), on facts
almost identical to those of the instant case. Southgate acted as a broker
for suppliers in their sales to wholesalers; however, in some transactions
Southgate bought for its own account, then resold to wholesalers. Upon
finding that brokerage or discounts to Southgate were the same in the lat-

CASE COMMENTS
The instant case, if followed,' 5 would significantly change the
existing law, opening up new possibilities of distribution: An intermediary like respondent could benefit small suppliers and wholesalers by performing distributive functions impossible for one
who operates only as a classical broker.' Nevertheless, the substitution of a flexible standard for the per se prohibition presents
uncertainties and reopens the possibility that the "brokerage"
label could again be used to conceal coerced discounts. In the instant case, as the FTC pointed out, Hruby was "clearly not a
'dummy' broker controlled by a large buyer to whom he passed on
phony brokerage payments"; nor was he "himself a powerful
wholesaler or retail chain exacting from his suppliers false brokerage payments.' 7 In a case where a favored buyer might have
some of the attributes of economic power, however, a definite legal
standard will be necessary. Unfortunately, what that legal standard is or ought to be is left unclear by the instant case.
ter cases as in the former, the court held that Southgate had violated §
91(c). The court rejected Southgate's arguments that no discrimination resulted from the practice and that Southgate performed services for suppliers,
even though both methods of distribution resulted in the same price to
wholesalers. See ATn'y GTR. NAT'L. Comt. AN-T-mUST RP. 190-93 (1955).
"In our opinion, the virtual legal monopoly conferred by Section 2(c) on
one type of middleman clogs competition in the channels of distribution,
and exacts tribute from the consumer for the benefit of a special business
class." Id. at 191. See also Adelman, supra note 8, at 3$-36; Backman, An
Ecmomist Looks at the Robinson-Patman Act, 17 A.BA. A2mausT SEc.
343, 345-46 (1960). But see Robinson v. Stanley Home Prods., Inc., 272
F.2d 601 (1st Cir. 1959), which held that a price reduction upon conversion from selling through brokers to direct selling only was not a violation
of § 2(c).
15. In several recent cases the FTC had held respondents in violation
of § 2(c) on facts similar to those of the instant case. See Exchange Distrib.
Co., 1961-1963 TRADE RFG. REP.
15692, 15975 (FTC July 9, 1902) (intermediary like Hruby who dealt with Hruby's major supplier); Venus Foods,
1960-1961 TRADE; REG. REP. 29194 (FTC Oct. 28, 1960) (seller dispensed
with broker and engaged an exclusive distributor for one area). On a largescale investigation of the Florida fruit industry, the FTC had found the
business practices approved of in the instant case to be in widespread use.
The FTC issued cease and desist orders to numerous Florida suppliers,
at least one of whom, Keen Fruit Corp., sold to Hruby. )Keen Fruit Corp.,
1961-1963 TRADE REG. RP.
15185 (FTC May 19, 1961); cJ. Kintner,
The Role of Robinson-Patman in the Antitrust Scheme of Things-the
Perspective of Enforcement Officials, 17 A.B.A. ANTrruST SEC. 315, 319
(1960).
16. See EDwARDs 141-46; RowE 357-59; Austin, Price Discri nation and
the Small Business Man, 16 A.B.A. ANTImUST Sac. 94, 102-03 (1960); Oppenheim, supra note 7, at 536-38.
17. Instant case at 21051.
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Congressional statements, which concentrated on the problem
of chain-store coercion, are even less helpful at defining a standard. The most reasonable conclusion that can be drawn from the
legislative history is that Congress intended a per se prohibition.
Nevertheless, there is no indication that Congress considered the
possibility of an economically justified discount on a direct sale
in the context of the brokerage provision;18 Congress probably
intended to prohibit brokerage or discounts in lieu thereof with
only false "brokerage" payments in mind. 9 Therefore, a flexible
application of section 2(c) is not inconsistent with congressional
intent if that standard permits only justified discounts, unforeseen by Congress, while continuing to prohibit false practices.
The applicable legal standard, then, must differentiate between
the justified and the coerced discount. The discounts granted respondent in the instant case are quite easy to justify economically.
From the supplier's viewpoint, selling to respondent rather than
to wholesalers resulted in cost savings that made possible a discount; from the intermediary's viewpoint, the discount made it
possible for him to perform unique distributional functions while
still attaining a profit on resale. Theoretically, the discount
equalled cost savings to suppliers, which equalled the intermediary's cost of distributional functions assumed. Taking the transaction in the instant case as a prototype, proof of the justifiability
of a discount might proceed from the showing of cost savings of
the seller or cost disbursements by the buyer.20
A price discrimination based upon "differences in cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery" 21 is justifiable under section 2(a). Be-

cause of the per se prohibition against a "discount in lieu of
brokerage" under 2(c), however, it had been held that cost savings from lowered brokerage costs could not be used to justify a
lowered price, either under 2(a) or 2(c). 2 2 In Thomasville Chair
18. See H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15 (1930), reprinted

in RowB 604.
19. See the legislative history discussed in note 26 infra.
20. Of course, the discount must also be available to all other intermediaries. See FTC v. Morton Salt, 334 U.S. 37, 42 (1948).
21. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1958), amending Clayton
Act, § 2, 38 Stat. 730 (1914).
22. However, facts tending to show that a discount was the result of

cost savings other than brokerage cost savings were admissible. In a sale
where the seller enjoyed a reduction in brokerage and other costs, he was
permitted to pass on the savings in other costs, but not in brokerage. Main
Fish, 53 F.T.C. 88 (1956); cf. Fruitvale Canning Co., 52 F.T.C. 1504 (195o).
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Co. v. FTC, s however, the Fifth Circuit read the leading Supreme
Court case, FTC -v. Henry Broch & Co.,2 4 as interpreting 2(c) to
permit price reductions based on brokerage savings so long as
available to all buyers. 5 While this reading would seem to repudiate the explicit "in lieu of" language in 2(c), there is some legislative history which indicates Congress intended that true savings
on brokerage could be passed on to the buyerY The cost justification defense provides an apt legal standard for application of
2(c), since proof of cost savings to the seller precludes the possibility of a discount coerced by the buyer. In practice, however,
2S. 306 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1962). The FTC had held, in an interlocutory
order in Thomasville Chair Co., 55 F.T.C. 2076 (1958) that all facts which
would tend-to rebut the inference that a discount in lieu of brokerage had been
granted were admissible. Since Thomasville was unable to show that all of its
savings were from reduction in costs other than brokerage, the Commission
held that it had "passed on" a savings in brokerage; i.e., it had granted a discount in lieu of brokerage prohibited by 2(c). Thomasville Chair Co., supra.
94. 863 U.S. 166 (1960).
25. The Supreme Court, in the Broch case, approved of the factual approach of the Commission as illustrated by the Main Fis case. See note
22 supra. However, the majority opinion left unclear whether the Court
thought that a genuine savings in the cost of brokerage could be reflected
in the seller's price. The court in Thomawvlle thought such a reflection was
permissible:
However, as we read it, the Court's opinion says that a reduction in
price, giving effect to reduced commissions paid by the seller, are violations of Section 2(c) only if such reduction in price is "discriminatory." We read that to mean "without justification based on actual
bona fide differences in the costs of sales resulting from the differing
methods or quantities in which such commodities are sold or
delivered."
306 F-ad at 545.
26. The Senate Judiciary Committee amended the § 2(a) cost justification proviso to exclude brokerage savings from those savings that might
be used to justify a seller's price variation. S. REP. No. 1502, 74th Cong.,
id Sess. 5 (1936), reprinted in Rown 582-83. The amendment was deleted
by the Conference Committee "for the reason that brokerage is dealt with
in a subsequent subsection of the bill." H.R. REP'. No. 2951, 74th Cong.,
2d Sess. 6 (1936), reprinted in RowE 617. Senator Logan, the Senate floor
manager of the bill, stated that "I think perhaps legitimate brokerage ought
to be allowed as a part of the costs, and I think when the bill was draftedI did not write the bil-perhaps ... we had in mind dummy brokerage,
sham brokerage." 80 CONG. Rlc. 6285 (1936). The Chairman of the House Conferees stated that:
There is no limit to the phases of production, sale, and distribution in
which such improvements may be devised and the economies of su-

perior efficiency achieved, nor from which those economies, when
demonstrated, may be expressed in price differentials in favor of the
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it is questionable whether section 2(c) would be much more
permissive than now, because
of the arduous process of proof in
2
cost justification cases. 7
The Commission, in the instant case, stated that the discounts
to respondent were "not granted because on sales to him sellers
could dispense with brokerage services regularly required on their
sales, thus effecting savings of usual brokerage fees." 28 Rejecting
the cost justification defense, then, the Commission looked instead
to the other side of the transaction, the cost of the distributive
functions assumed by respondent." While these costs are far easier
to prove than cost justification, especially for the buyer, their
proof does not present the assurance of economic value that cost
justification does. Because savings to the seller need not equal
costs assumed by the buyer, proof of the buyer's assumption of
costs does not preclude the possibility that at least part of his
discount was economically coerced.
The Commission, however, required respondent to prove
neither seller's cost savings nor his own disbursements. Instead,
the majority opinion relied on the section 2(a) concept of a functional discount to reach its conclusion that section 2(c) had not
been violated. Since section 2(a) prohibits price discrimination
particular customers whose distinctive methods of purchase and delivery make them possible.
80 CoNG. REc. 9417 (1936).
The Brock majority minimized the significance of this legislative history,
saying that whatever its importance in a § 2(a) case, it was not relevant
to the facts at hand, where the seller's broker reduces commissions to make
a sale. The dissent took the view that cost justification of brokerage savings was available in a § 2(c) action. 363 U.S. at 185-86. Moreover, the
dissent reasoned, as did the court in Thomasville, that the majority's assertion that a reduction in price violates § 2(c) only when discriminatory
necessarily permits cost justification of brokerage. 863 U.S. at 188; see
RowE 287-92, 844-45. But see Robinson v. Stanley Home Prods., Inc., 272
F.2d 601 (1st Cir. 1959).
27. See Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 68-69 (1953).
28. Instant case at 21051.
29. In effect, this analysis constitutes a broad construction of the "services rendered" exception of § 2(c), even though the Commission did not
base its reasoning on the words of the exception. In the light of the legislative history, it would be difficult to justify such a broad construction
of those terms. Whatever was exactly intended by the ambiguous "services rendered" exception, it is fairly clear that it was meant to apply only
to classical brokerage services and not to transportation and storage of goods
by a buyer for his own account after having taken title to the goods. See
note 18 spra; of. Southgate Brokerage Co. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 607, 610 (4th
Cir. 1945).
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only where it results in competitive "injury,"' 3 its prohibition does
not apply where favored buyers from the same seller do not compete. The majority found a clear 2(a) functional discount in the
instant case, because respondent operated between the supplier
and wholesalers (disfavored buyers), reselling to wholesalers at
substantially the same price offered wholesalers by suppliersP1
Applying this 2(a) analysis to the 2(c) case, the majority reasoned
that respondent's discounts were justified because they were
granted in recognition of the different functional levels of respondent and wholesalers, and not to effect a price concession to
one of many buyers on equal levels.
The presence or absence of 2(a) "injury" is of questionable
relevance in a 2(c) case, where the sole issue should be whether a
discount is justified or coerced. If, the Commission had relied only
on proof of the respondent's assumption of distribution functions,
however, it would have made possible the avoidance of section
2(c) without resort to justification by proof of seller's cost savings. 2 By its reliance on the functional discount analysis, the
Commission, in effect, denied this opportunity to all but the
single-function intermediary The instant case, by implication,
also denied the availability of a seller's cost justification defense;
30. See FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55 (1959); Automatic
Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.. 61 (1953); General Foods Corp., 50 F.T.C.
885 (1954). See generally RowE 108-11; ATSr Grs. NAT'L Cozex. ANiTRusT REP. 160-63 (1955).

31. Rruby's discount would be a functional discount under 0(a) only
as long as he stayed in this competitive niche. If he should sell to retailers,
he would be in competition with wholesalers and his discount would not
be deemed functional. See FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470 (1951). If
mruby were to "pass on" his discount by undercutting the supplier's prices
to wholesalers, the discount would be open to the charge of 2(a) tertiary
line discrimination; i.e., anti-competitive effects at the level of customers
of the supplier's customer. See Standard Oil Co., 41 F.T.C. 263 (1945),
approved, Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 173 F-ad 210 (7th Cir. 1949), rev'c
on
other grounds, 340 U.S. 231 (1951). But perhaps there is no vitality in that
doctrine because of its inherent tendency to encourage price-fixing by the
supplier, contrary to broader antitrust policies. See FTC v. Standard Oil

Co., 355 US. 596 (1958).
32. The Attorney General's Report, in effect, favored this test. It recommended a revitalization of the "services rendered" exception, but it felt
that legislative action was necessary for that result. Azr'x Gm. N e.L Cozms.
ANTR=UST REP. 190-93 (1955). See also 45 Mnqrr. L. Rnv. 659, 668-69
(1961).

33. There was some evidence that respondent at times sold to retailers,
from which the dissent argued that a 2(a) functional discount was not
present. The majority, however, rejected this evidence on the ground that
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but, in light of the Thomasville case, this defense would seem to
be available still to all respondents 4 Cost justification, however,
may be practically impossible for some, including the vertically
integrated chain store that buys goods from countless suppliers.
Therefore, while the recent developments under 2(c) have relieved
the section of a repressive application, they have limited an easy
escape from it to the single-function intermediary, almost by definition a small, independent businessman.
If these are to be the standards by which section 2(c) is applied, the section will become a substantive facsimile of section
2(a) instead of the per se prohibition it has been in the past. Prothe extent of such sales and their prices were not presented in the record.
By doing so, the majority sidestepped a difficult 2(a) controversy in pointed
analogy to the problem in the instant case. At present, under 2(a), only
a buyer's functional position, dependent on his resale practices, is conclusive in a functional discount case. See note 31 supra. However, many commentators have argued that the functional discount defense ought to apply to favored buyers, regardless of their resale practices, whenever they
have assumed distributional functions not performed by disfavored buyers.
See EDWARDS 344-48; RowE 190-93; ATT'Y GEn. NAT'L Coimv. ANTITIRUST
REa. 202-29 (1955); Adelman, supra note 8, at 233-36; Oppenheim, Fed-

eral Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised National Antitrust Policy, 50 MICH. L. REv. 1139, 1206-17 (1952). At one time, the Commission

showed a disposition to follow this advice. In Doubleday & Co., 52 F.T.C.
169, 207-09 (1955), a 2(a) functional discount case, the Commission permitted Doubleday to present evidence to show that its discount to certain buyers was economically justified because of the unique services that
those buyers performed, regardless of their functional positions. But General Foods Corp., 52 F.T.C. 798, 825 (1956) undercut the importance of
the Doubleday language and emphasized that the buyer's functional position, dependent on his resale practices, was conclusive in a functional dis15686, at 20519-20
count case. Mueller Co., 1961-1963 TRA"a REG. REP.
(FTC Jan. 12, 1962), clearly rejected Doubleday and approved General
Foods. The Commission in the instant case, by limiting its holding to the
situation "where the distributor who receives the lower price does not compete at the wholesale level," declined to reopen the functional discount dcbate under 2(c). Instant case at 21052.
34. It might be argued, however, that although the requirements of §
2(a) might be satisfied by something less than cost justification, § 2(c),
which explicitly prohibits a certain kind of unjustified discount, requires
exact cost justification in all cases. While such an argument is logically
sound, it hardly seems reasonable, if 2(c) is to be made less repressive,
to provide only one defense, and that one little better than none at all.
The Supreme Court, while passing on the FTC's order to Henry Broch &
Co., intimated that a variety of defenses are available under 2(c). FTC
v. Henry Broch & Co., 368 U.S. 360, 367 (1962). See also Austin, supra
note 16, at 104; 28 U. CHi. L. REV. 505, 516-20 (1961); cf. In re Whitney
& Co., 273 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1959).
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cedurally, however, it will be easier still to bring a 2(c) action than
a 2(a) action. Under section 2(a), the party bringing the action
must show a price discrimination between buyers of the same
seller and the possibility of injury to competition arising from
such discrimination? 5 Under section 2(f), which applies 2(a)'s substance to buyers, a prima facie case includes knowledge by the
buyer that he was receiving a favorable discrimination unjustifiable under section 2(a). 8 The 2(c) prima facie case, however, includes only the payment of brokerage or a discount in lieu thereof,
whether the respondent is a buyer or a seller. This procedural advantage should continue 2(c)'s effectiveness as an enforcement
tool, while 2(c)'s substantive changes will make available limited
but useful marketing methods.
Criminal Law: Federal Injunction
Against State Official in State Proceeding
Improper Remedy for Illegally Obtained Evidence
Respondent Bolger was arrested by federal Customs officers
and held in custody without having been arraigned, in violation
of Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.' During
his detention federal officers searched his home without a warrant
in violation of Federal Rule 41 Present during the later part of
the interrogation was petitioner Cleary, a detective for the bistate New York-New Jersey Waterfront Commission, which had
been informed of the arrest. When New York City police subse85. See, e.g., General Foods Corp., 50 F.T.C. 885, 890 (1954).
86. See, e.g., Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953).
1.
Rule 5. Proceedings before the Commissioner
(a) Appearance before the Commissioner. An officer making an arrest under a warrant issued upon a complaint or any person making
an arrest without a warrant shall take the arrested person without
unnecessary delay before the nearest available commissioner or before any other nearby officer empowered to commit persons charged
with offenses against the laws of the United States. When a person
arrested without a warrant is brought before a commissioner or other
officer, a complaint shall be filed forthwith.

FED. R. CaL P. 5(a).

2. Bolger consented to the search after his request for counsel was refused and after he was told by the officers that his consent was in fact
unnecessary. The district court found that the consent was not freely and
intelligently given and did not constitute a valid waiver of Bolger's constitutional rights. Bolger v. United States, 189 F. Supp. 237, 253 (S.).N.Y.

1960).
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quently charged respondent with larceny and the Waterfront
Commission suspended his hiring agent and longshoreman's
licenses, he brought suit in a federal district court seeking to
enjoin the federal officers and petitioner Cleary from using or
testifying about the evidence. The district court granted the
requested relief;' and on appeal, by Cleary alone, the Court of
Appeals affirmed. On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court
reversed and held that the federal courts will not enjoin testimony
by state officials in state criminal proceedings where there is no
evidence of an attempt to avoid federal requirements and the
information has not been acquired by the state officials in violation of a federal court order. Cleaj v. Bolger, 371 U.S. 392
(1963).
Because state courts have been more liberal than federal
courts in admitting evidence "tainted" with illegality,' defendants
in state criminal trials have occasionally attempted to utilize
federal injunctive procedure to secure the benefits of the federal
exclusionary rules. In Stefanelli v. Minard' the Supreme Court
affirmed the denial of a federal injunction 7 against evidence seized
unconstitutionally by state agents on the ground that equity
seldom interferes with a criminal prosecution, a fortiori federal
equitable relief should not intervene in state criminal proceedings.
Disparately, in Rea v. United States8 the Court enjoined a federal
agent from testifying in a state criminal proceeding as to evidence
previously excluded by a federal court--the injunction was a
proper exercise of the supervisory power of the federal courts
over federal agents. 10 The scope of Rea was narrowed consider3. Bolger v. United States, 189 F. Supp. 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
4. Bolger v. Cleary, 293 F.2d 368 (2d Cir. 1961).
5. Compare Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952), with Nardone v.
United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937). Compare Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S.
55 (1951), with Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
6. 342 U.S. 117 (1951).
7. Plaintiffs based their claim on the Civil Rights Act of 1871, Rev. Stat.
§ 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1958), which provides that every person
using a state law to deprive a citizen of constitutional rights shall be liable
to the injured party in an "action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress."
8. 350 U.S. 214 (1956).
9. The evidence was excluded because the search warrant under which
the federal agents had operated was found invalid. Exclusion, then, was required by the familiar federal exclusionary rules of Weeks v. United States,
282 U.S. 383 (1914).

10. Justice Douglas for the majority emphatically limited the decision to
that ground.
No attempt was made to justify the injunction as a protection of the
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ably, however, by Wilson v. Schnettler," in which the Court
declined to enjoin the admission in a state court of evidence seized
by federal agents acting without a search warrant. Rea was distinguished' 2 on the ground that in Wilson there was no abuse of
federal process since no warrant had been issued and that there
had not been a prior determination of inadmissibility by a federal
3
court
rights given the petitioner by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The
aiure to use this argument, which in the instant case was seriously to
handicap Bolger, may well have been deliberate; the federal rules, by the
terms of 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1958) (the enabling act), are meant to apply
only in the federal courts. The federal exclusionary policies expressed in
Weeks v. United States, 232 US. 383 (1914) and Mallory v. United States,
354 U.S. 449 (i957) did not then apply to state courts, see Gallegos v.
Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 US. 25 (1949), and
it was in fact Rea's rights in the state court that were at issue.
Justice Harlan, joined in a vigorous dissent by Justices Reed, Burton,
and Minton, protested that the decision was unprecedented in its suggestion that "the federal courts share with the executive branch of the Government responsibility for supervising law enforcement activities as such."
Reav. United States, 350 U.S. 214, 218 (1956).
Justice Harlan was undoubtedly correct as far as he went. Nevertheless,
at the time of the Rea decision, and even more frequently thereafter, courts
have protected the rights of accused parties by the indirect means of excluding evidence obtained in violation of those rights. See, e.g., Mapp v.
Ohio, S67 U.S. 643 (1961); Mallory v. United States, msupra; Weeks v. United
States, supra; People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955); Paulsen, The Fourteenth Amenument and the Third Degree, 6 STAN. L. Rnv.
411, 429 (1954). The ultimate aim of the courts in excluding illegally obtained evidence is deterrence of the unlawful conduct of law-enforcement
officers that led to the evidence. From this indirect disciplinary power of
the exclusionary rules to the more direct disciplinary power asserted by the
Court in Rea is only a short step. See the dissent by Justice Douglas in
Wilson v. Schnettler, 365 U.S. 381, 396-97 (1961):
When I wrote for the Court in ... [Real saying that "[t]he obligation
of the federal agent is to obey the Rules," I thought we meant obedience to the substantive law for which those rules offer a procedural
matrix.
11. 365 U.S. 381 (1961)
12. Wilson v. Schnettler, 365 U.S. 381, 386-88 (1961).
As an alternative holding the Court denied the injunction because the
petitioner, by neglecting to allege that his arrest was made "without probable cause," had failed to show that the subsequent search of his person
was unlawful. Justice Stewart said the Court was basing its decision upon
failure to recite a "talismanic phrase." Id. at 388 (concurring opinion); see
The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, 75 HARv. L. REv. 80, 164 (1961).
18. The result of the opinion, Justice Douglas noted in dissent, was to
give "federal agents carte blanche to break down doors, ransack homes,
search and seize to their heart's content-so long as they stay away from
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In the instant case the district court felt that the Rea case was
governing, for all of the evidence had been gathered by federal
agents in violation of the federal rules. The only distinction was
that an injunction was sought against Cleary, a state officer, as
well as against the federal officers. The district court reasoned
that the injunction had to run against Cleary also, for unless he
was enjoined he would "act as a vehicle to defeat the policy
enunciated in the Rea case of protecting the privacy of the
citizen against invasion in violation of the federal rules. 14 The
Supreme Court, however, insisted that the principles outlined
in Stefanelli still governed, because of Cleary's status as a state
officer. The Court rejected the analysis that an injunction
against Cleary was necessary to make the injunction against
the federal officers effective: "Such relief as to him [Cleary] must
stand on its own bottom."'" Apparently the "bottom" would have
had to have been a showing of affirmative misconduct by the
state officer or a deliberate evasion of federal requirements by the
federal officers. 6
The distinction drawn by the Court between federal and state
agents seems somewhat ingenuous. Justice Douglas in dissent
argued that the violation of the federal rules by the federal
agents was the crucial issue; the danger in ignoring this issue
and making the state agent immune from injunction was suggested by an analogy: Cleary, the state agent, was like Oliver Twist
who was small enough to go through openings that his
mentor in crime could not negotiate.1 Thus, "an injunction
federal courts . .

."

Wilson v. Schnettler, 365 U.S. 381, 398 (1961). The

dissent in Wilson is a very persuasive statement in favor of the policyand in favor of an expansion of the policy- adopted by the Court in Rca.
The decision in Wilson casts heavy doubt on the correctness of the district court's injunction against the federal officers in the instant case. The
district court opinion (decided before Wilson v. Schnettler, 275 F.2d 932
(7th Cir. 1960) had been affirmed by the Supreme Court) was based in
part upon a rejection of the Seventh Circuit's reasoning. Bolger v. United
States, 189 F. Supp. 237, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). There is a distinct undertone of reservation in the majority opinion in the instant case regarding the
propriety of the lower court's ruling on this issue. But of. instant case at
409 n.1 (dissenting opinion).
14. Bolger v. United States, 189 F. Supp. 237, 255 (S.D.N.Y. 19060).
15. Instant case at 399.
16. Instant case at 399-400.
17.
It was a little lattice window, about five feet and a half above the
ground: at the back of the house: which belonged to a scullery, or
small brewing-place, at the end of the passage. The aperture was so
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should issue lest federal agents accomplish illegal results by
boosting Oliver Twist through windows built too narrow by
those Rules for their own ingress.""' The district court advanced
a similar thought when it characterized Cleary as a "human
recorder." 9
In fact, little attention was paid to the circumstances that
brought Cleary to Bolger's interrogation. Although the Court
indicated that Cleary would have been enjoined if there had been
any indication that his presence was part of a deliberate scheme
to avoid the federal rules, no such scheme could be found. Nevertheless, the illegal search of Bolger's house and the daylong detention were certainly deliberate, or inexcusably ignorant, violations
of the federal rules. Since it is against these that the accused
should be protected, the attitude, purpose, or timing of the
federal officers in passing information gained from these violations
over to the state officers should be irrelevant.
. The essential problem dealt with by the Court in the instant
case involves the role that the federal courts are to play in
protecting accused parties against violation of their rights by
law-enforcement officials. The federaf system has all too often
provided a way for police avoidance of restrictive rules of conduct
enforced in one jurisdiction but not in another.2 1 On the federal
side, the Supreme Court has been forced to react by developing
exclusionary rules against evidence illegally obtained by state
officials.2 2 This was comparatively easy; few could dispute the
power of the federal courts to regulate the evidence brought before
them. Further, the Court, acting under asserted constitutional
mandates as in Mapp v. Ohio has been able to apply some limits
to the evidence that state courts may hear.
small, that the inmates had probably not thought it worth while to
defend it more securely; but it was large enough to admit a boy of
Oliver's size, nevertheless. A very brief exercise of Mr. Sikes's art, sufficed to overcome the fastening of the lattice; and it soon stood wide

open also.
TwisT 184 (N.Y. Thos. Y. Crowell &
Co.), quoted by Justice Douglas, instant case at 407.
18. Instant case at 407.
19. Bolger v. United States, 189 F. Supp. 237, 255 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
20. Because the circumstances under which the evidence passes are diffiDICKENS, THE ADvENTuRES OF OmvE

cult to ascertain, lower courts will henceforth unnecessarily have to become
involved in elaborate fact-finding when faced with similar cases.
21. See Bichner, Impact of the Rea Case on the Law of Illegal Search and
Seizure, 9 U. FL& L. R v. 178 (1956).
2. Elldns v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
23. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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There remain, however, a few situations where law-enforcement officials may continue to use evidence obtained in violation
of prescribed law-enforcement standards.2 4 For example, it is
unclear what restraints exist upon testimony by federal officers
in state courts in regard to evidence obtained in violation of the
federal rules. The Rea case seemed, at least momentarily, to offer
a partial solution to problems of this type. Limited to its facts it
no doubt remains good law. Wilson v. Schnettler, however, appears to have confined Rea, and the instant case has shown at
least one situation where an injunction against federal officers
proved ineffective in protecting an accused against violations of
the federal rules. Moreover, doubt remains as to the propriety of
granting relief by way of injunction.2 5
The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed that the federal
2
courts should use their injunctive power against the states
when it appears necessary "to prevent irreparable injury which
is clear and imminent. ' 7 But while consistently repeating this
phrase, the Court never seems to have defined it. In Stefanelli
the Court seemed to imply that irreparable injury was suffered
when federal constitutional rights were violated and no appeal
was available.2 8 If this is so, it tends to indicate that the "ir24. Arguably, the cure of police lawlessness is a task for law-enforcement officials themselves and not for the courts. Nevertheless, the recent
trend has been for the courts to handle this problem as best they can, because the police have been doing such a poor job of policing themselves.
The method adopted is the exclusionary rules. Mapp v. Ohio, 307 U.S.
643, 651-53 (1961); People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 445, 282 P.2d 905,
911-12 (1955); see Kamisar, Public Safety v. Individual Libdrties: Somc
"Facts" and "'Theories," 53 J. CnnM. L., C. & P.S. 171, 179-82 (102); oJ.
Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
25. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Rea, suggested that the net result is
a race between the state prosecution and a federal injunction. If the state
can introduce illegally obtained evidence before being enjoined, the accused
is without a remedy. Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214, 220-21 (1956).
26. No one has denied that the federal courts have such power; even
the dissenters in Rea conceded on that issue. Rea v. United States, 350
U.S. 214, 219 (1956). The denial of relief in cases such as Stefanelli has
been based upon the exercise of equitable discretion.
27. Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 163 (1943), quoted in
Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 122 (1951).
28.
No . . .irreparable injury, clear and imminent, is threatened here.
At worst, the evidence sought to be suppressed may provide the basis for conviction of the petitioners in the New Jersey courts. Such a
conviction, we have held, would not deprive them of due process of
law. Wolf v. Colorado ....
Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 122 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.)
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reparable injury" exception to the anti-injunction policy in this
area is so narrow as to be nearly nonexistent: any petitioner
seeking an injunction who alleges that a state conviction will
deny him his federal constitutional rights is told that he has
an adequate remedy by way of appeal.2 9 If he alleges mere violations of federal standards or other rights not of constitutional
dignity, conviction by means of these violations will not deprive
him of due process
of law and hence will not cause him "irrepar'30
able injury"
.
Although the phrase did not appear in the opinion, the irreparable injury doctrine worked against Bolger. His complaint
about the search of his home, though cast in terms of a violation of Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, was
essentially an allegation that his rights under the fourth amendment were violated. Under the recent decision in Mapp v. Ohio3 1
state courts are required to exclude evidence obtained through
such violations, regardless of whether state or federal officers
gathered the evidence. Thus Bolger's rights would probably be
protected in the state court, and if they were not, he still had
his remedy of appeal. Justice Goldberg concurred separately in
the denial of the injunction for just this reason,32 and the Court's
opinion mentioned, but did not rely on it.3 3 The difficulty with
this rationale, as Justice Douglas in dissent pointed out, is that
much of the evidence against Bolger was gathered in violation
of Rule 5(a) of the federal rules; and Mapp v. Ohio offers no
guarantee of exclusion of this evidence in state courts.2' Fur29. Instant case at 402 (concurring opinion).
30. Stefanelli v. Wnard, 342 U.S. 117, 122 (1951). Except for Bolger's
success against the federal officers in the instant case, the petitioner in
Rea was the only litigant making a claim for relief based on illegally ob-

tained evidence to break out of this vicious circle. The Court aided him in
doing so by side-stepping the irreparable injury problem and relying on an

asserted supervisory power over federal officers. See note 10 supra. But the
aid given to the petitioner in Rea was later to prove Bolger's undoing.
Bolger's claim was essentially one of violation of rights given him by the

federal rules, but the circumstances of the case obliged him to proceed
against a state official; yet the only precedent on which he could rely,

namely Rea, was based squarely and explicitly upon the narrow ground of
control over federal officers.
31. 867 U.S. 643 (1961).
82. Instant case at 402-03.
35. Instant case at 400-01.

84. The familiar McNabb-Mallory rule requires exclusion of this evidence
in federal courts. Mallory v. United States, 354 US. 449 (1957); McNabb
v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943). Bolger may still be able to have all
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thermore, it is doubtful, as Justice Goldberg's opinion admitted,
whether the exclusionary rules of Maprp will apply in the state
administrative proceedings."5
The procedural context of the instant case, however, cannot
be forgotten; the question that the instant case presented to the
Court related to the nature of the remedy and not to the desirability of an exclusionary policy. The federal courts have traditionally shown a great reluctance to use their injunctive power
to interfere in any way with state criminal law enforcement.
As a practical matter the mere availability of possible relief in
the federal courts could lead to considerable harassment and
delay. Furthermore, as a matter of comity, the federal courts
must assume that the state courts are competent to protect
the rights, both state and federal, of accused parties brought

before them.
If injunction is an undesirable remedy, a new exclusionary
rule may be the preferable alternative. Justice Goldberg, in his
separate concurrence, suggested that the supremacy clause could
be a basis for requiring state courts to exclude evidence of the
kind involved in the instant case.38 Perhaps the best justification for this proposed exclusionary rule would be the inherent
power of any court to go beyond statutory mandate to prevent
abuse of its processes by officers who owe obedience to the court

and to its rules.39 This exclusionary solution may seem like a

the evidence against him excluded by the New York courts as being the
fruit of an illegal search. See People v. Rodriguez, 11 N.Y.2d 279, 183
N.E.2d 651, 229 N.Y.S.2d 353 (1962), cited by Justice Goldberg, instant
case at 402 n.1 (concurring opinion).
35. Cf. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960); In re Groban, 852 U.S.
330 (1957).
36. Pugach v. Dollinger, 365 U.S. 458 (1961); Stefanelli v. Minard, 342
U.S. 117 (1951); Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 819 U.S. 157 (1943); Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387 (1941); Beal v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 312 U.S.
45 (1941); see 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1958); Note, 4 STAN. L. Rnv. 381 (1952).
37. Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 123-24 (1951); Brief for Petitioner, pp. 20-22, instant case.
38. Instant case at 404. He said it was an argument that "will warrant
serious consideration in an appropriate case." The suggestion appears to
be without precedent; the wiretapping cases would seem to be clearly to
the contrary. Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952) (no federal officers
were involved, but the convictions were obtained with evidence gathered
and divulged in direct contravention of federal statute). But see Note, State
Remedia fdr Federally-CreatedRights, 47 Mum. L. Rzv. 815, 830-33 (1903).
39. Cf. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Elkins v. United States,
364 U.S. 206 (1960); Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 (1957); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United States, 318
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drastic interference with state processes, but in the long run it
should prove less troublesome and easier to use than an injunctive remedy. As long as the state courts remain a ready avenue
for avoidance of the federal rules, the Supreme Court will have
to find some further means to protect against illegal conduct by
federal agents.

Criminal Law: Indigent, Capital Defendant's
Right to Counsel on Petition for Certiorari
Petitioner was convicted in New York of first degree murder
and sentenced to death. After the New York Court of Appeals
affirmed his conviction, petitioner requested that that court
appoint counsel to prepare his petition for a writ of certiorari to
the United States Supreme Court. When this request and his
subsequent petition for certiorari, prepared with the aid of a law
school professor, 2 were denied." petitioner instituted a federal
habeas corpus proceeding, asserting that his constitutional rights
had been violated. The district court dismissed the proceeding on
the ground that a state need not assign counsel to an indigent defendant who already enjoys the assistance of counsel.4 On appeal,
U.S. 832 (1943); Nardone v. United States, S02 U.S. 379 (1937); Weeks
v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434,
282 Pad 905 (1955).
The Court could lay down an even broader rule- probably on due
process grounds-requiring state courts to exclude evidence obtained by
either state or federal officers during prolonged detention without arraignment. So far, it has shown no inclination to so rule. Gallegos v. Nebraska,
342 U.S. 55 (1951); cf. Tines v. State, 203 Tenn. 612, 315 S.W.2d 111, cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 889 (1958); Walker v. State, 162 Tex. Crim. 408, 280
S.W.2d 144 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 931 (1956). But see Broeder, Wong
Sun v. United States: A Study in Faith and Hope, 42 Nun. L. P~v. 483,
564-96 (1963).
1. People v. Coleman, 10 N.Y.2d 765, 177 N.E.2d 58, 219 N.Y.S.d 612
(1961).
2. During the appellate proceedings in this case, petitioner was receiving
the voluntary assistance of Professor Norman Redlich of the New York
University Law School. Professor Redlich was instrumental in securing stays
of execution and assisting Coleman with his pro se applications for appointment of counsel and, ultimately, the writ of certiorari.
3. United States ex rel. Coleman v. Denno, 313 F.2d 457, 459 (2d Cir.
1963) (request for appointment of counsel was denied on Dec. 7, 1961);
Coleman v. New York, 369 U.S. 826 (1962) (petition for certiorari denied).
4. Although Professor Redlicli's efforts were restricted to the single question of the constitutionality of the absence of any provision for state appointed counsel, the district court believed that such "exemplary representation" made "moot" the question which petitioner sought to raise.
United States ez rel. Coleman v. Denno, 205 F. Supp. 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
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the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in affirming, broadened the district court's decision 5 and held that the "due process"
and "equal protection" clauses of the fourteenth amendment do
not require a state to appoint counsel to aid petitioners seeking
certiorari. United States ex rel. Coleman v. Denno, 318 F.2d 457
(2d Cir. 1963).'

The Supreme Court has moved slowly in determining the scope
of the indigent defendant's constitutional right to appointed
counsel; although recent decisions have illuminated some aspects
of the problem, 7 whether this right extends to a petition for
certiorari remains unclear.8 In 1982, in Powell v. Alabama,' the
Supreme Court relied on the fourteenth amendment in determining that at least in some capital cases a state's denial of counsel
violates "fundamental principles of liberty and justice." 10 Six years
later the Court, in Johnson v. Zerbst,n held that in a federal court
an indigent has an absolute right to counsel in all criminal proceedings; but in 1942, the Court, in Betts v. Brady,12 restricted the
state indigent's right to assigned counsel to those cases where the
lack of counsel due to "special circumstances" or "prejudicial
error" would render the trial offensive to the common and funda5. The Second Circuit acknowledged the "mooted" nature of petitioner's
claim, but the court was not content to rely upon mootness and chose to
face the broader issue.
6. Cert. denied, 873 U.S. 919 (1968).
7. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 853 (1968) (extended the right to assigned counsel for state defendants to the first appeal); Gideon v. Wainwright, 872 U.S. 835 (1968) (extended the right to assigned counsel at trial
to all state criminals); Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674 (1958) (extended
the federal criminal's right to assigned counsel to appellate proceedings).
8. For pre-Douglas and -Gideon discussions of the right to counsel on
petition for certiorari, see Boskey, The Right to Counsel in Appellate Proceedings, 45 Mux .L. REv. 783, 799-801 (1961); Comment, Right to Counsel in
Federal CollateralAttack Proceedings: Section 255, 80 U. Cni. L. REv. 583
(1968).
9. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
10. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1982). The Court's holding can
be read as applicable only to those cases where the defendant is incapable
of making his own defense due to "ignorance, feeble mindedness, illiteracy,
or the like." Id. at 71.
11. 804 U.S. 458 (1938).
12. 816 U.S. 455 (1942).
18. Id. at 473. To a degree, the Betts ruling extended the indigent's right
to appointed counsel beyond the "line" drawn by the Powell Court, in that
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mental ideas of fairness and justice. 3 After 21 years"' Betts was
overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright;5 the right to appointed counsel was deemed "fundamental and essential to fair trials" and the
sixth amendment was "incorporated" into the fourteenth. 0
On the same day that it decided Gideon, the Court, in Douglas
v. California, held that every indigent convicted of a serious

crime who desires to prosecute a first appeal has an absolute right
to appointed counsel. The Douglas decision, based as it was on
counsel was made available to the accused in noncapital cases where "special circumstances" existed. See Kamisar, Betts v. Brady Twenty Years Later:
The Right to Counsel and Due Process Values, 61 MmcH. L. REv. 219, 2.55
(1962). On the other hand, the Betts decision was quite unresponsive to
the rationale in Johnson v. Zdrbst, in that Betts provided no "mechanical
rule" for assignment of counsel, even in capital cases. Under the Betts test,
the courts at first limited appointed counsel, for the most part, to capital
cases. See Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 385 US. 437, 441 (1948); Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 676 (1948). But Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 55
(1961), clearly established that defendants in capital cases had an absolute
right to appointed counsel.
14. For the proposition that during the 21 years that Betts reigned the
Court provided little illumination on the issue of right to appointed counsel or the sixth amendment itself, see Kadish, The Advocate and the Ex:pert-Counsel in the Peno-Correctional Process, 45 Mnw. L. Rxv. 803,

806-12 (1961).
In the federal courts during this period, the right to appointed counsel for indigent defendants was extended to appellate proceedings. See, e.g.,
Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962); Ellis v. United States,
356 US. 674 (1958); Johnson v. United States, 352 US. 565 (1957). For
a cutting back on the degree of "special circumstances" required by the
Betts holding, see Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443 (1962); McNeal
v. Culver, 365 US. 109 (1961); Hudson v. North Carolina, 363 US. 697
(1960). But see Pogolick v. State, 141 So. 2d 206 (Ala. Ct. App. 1902);
Artrip v. State, 136 So. 2d 574 (Ala. Ct. App. 1962); Jones v. Cochran,
125 So. 2d 99 (Fla. 1960); Commonwealth ex rel. Simon v. Maroney, 405
Pa. 562, 176 A.2d 94 (1961).
15. 372 US. 335 (1968).
16. See Kamisar & Choper, The Right to Counsel in Minnesota: Some
Field Findings and Legal-Policy Observations, 48 M.MT. L. Rv. 1 (1963);
24 U. Prr. L. Ray. 851 (1963). The significance of Gideon may lie not so
much in the fact that it raised indigent state defendants to the level
achieved by their federal counterparts in Johnson v. Zerbst, but that it
opens the door to the states so that any constitutionally based extension of
the right to appointed counsel that binds the federal courts will be required
by "due process" to bind the state courts. Of. Ker v. California, 374 U.S.

28 (1968).
17. 372 US. 353 (1963).
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Griffin v. Illinois"8 and the concept of "14th amendment equality,"' 9 might signify that the indigent defendant must be furnished
legal assistance at every phase of an appeal where the defendant
might utilize retained counsel.20 To date, however, no court has
held that an indigent defendant has an absolute right to assigned
counsel at certiorari.
In the instant case, decided before Gideon and Douglas, the
court relied on the lack of precedent for petitioner's contentions;
the court distinguished cases such as Powell as being inapplicable
because they involved the right to counsel at trial. In doing so the
court begged the question of whether the Powell requirementappointment of counsel "at every step in the proceedings against"
18. 351 U.S. 12 (1956). Griffin held that a state's failure to provide a
bill of exceptions for all indigent defendents to enable them to appeal their
conviction was a violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
19. "Fourteenth amendment equality" is an elusive concept, at best. If
it mean "absolute equality," it presents at least two specific problems. First,
where does "equal protection" end? Does it mean that an indigent must
not only have appointed counsel but the "best" counsel available, too? Second, there is no equivalent clause in the federal courts: As a result, if, as
has been suggested, Douglas provided state indigent defendants with rights
not yet accorded to their federal counterparts, are the federal courts bound
by that decision? See Kamisar & Choper, supra note 16, at 7. On the other
hand, "fourteenth amendment equality" may also mean only that equality
which is necessary to meet "due process" requirements. For a discussion of
these issues, see note 28, infra.
20. The inference that the indigent state defendant has a constitutional
right to appointed counsel at certiorari can be drawn by considering Douglas and Griffin together. Before Douglas, Griffin was interpreted as dealing
only with the accessibility of the indigent defendant to the appellate courts, not
the equality or the lack thereof, that lie might encounter in the appellate
proceedings themselves. Douglas, however, directs itself to the lack of equality that exists between a defendant with counsel on appeal and a defendant
appealing pro se.
Although the application of the Douglas doctrine to post-conviction hearings may require a showing of "special circumstances," cf. Kamisar & Choper,
supra note 16, at 10, some application of the doctrine seems a certainty.
This would not necessarily be so if the Griffin case had been limited to the
indigent defendant's first appeal. But Griffin has been extended to coram
nobis hearings, Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963); state collateral proceedings, Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961); and even applies after
the state has provided a review on the merits, Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S.
252 (1959). Thus, Douglas coupled with Griffin may demand not only that
the indigent state defendant have access to all post-conviction proceedings,
but that he also be accorded an equal opportunity to present the merit in
his case with the assistance of counsel. See Kamisar & Choper, supra note
16, at 13.
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the capital defendant 2 -- had been satisfied. Since the initial proceeding against an accused sets in motion the series of appellate
proceedings that might ultimately lead to a petition for certiorari,2 2 to conclude that "proceedings against" the defendant terminate at any point prior to the closing of the last avenue of appeal is
questionable. In the instant case, for example, a conviction of first
degree murder imposed the death sentence. To argue that the
"proceedings against" the petitioner terminated after his first
appeal appears unduly harsh in view of the fact that the law does
provide additional procedures for review. That the need for counsel for capital defendants at certiorari is as "fundamental and
essential to fair trials" as the need for trial assistance is at least
arguable. The sixth amendment guarantees the accused the right
to counsel "for his defense," and if literally applied to state offenders under the direction of Gideon, petitioner's "defense" should not
terminate before resolution of his case on the final appeal?
In "drawing the line" for the indigent's right to appointed
counsel prior to his petition for certiorari, the court in the instant
case balanced the petitioner's need for counsel against the in21. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.. 45, 69 (1932).
22. The proceedings against a defendant do not necessarily terminate
at the conclusion of his first appeal for he has the ultimate right to have
a federal court and federal judges pass on his federal contentions. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(c)(3) (1958). The argument has been made that the sixth amendment right to counsel pertains only to criminal proceedings and that a
petition for habeas corpus or certiorari are civil proceedings and, thus, excluded. See, e.g., Anderson v. Reize, 258 F.2d 479, 481 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 889 (1958); De Maris v. United States, 187 F. Supp. 273,
275 (S.D. Ind. 1960). However, in Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 712
(1961), the Supreme Court said:
We shall not quibble as to whether . . . it be called a civil or criminal action ....
The availability of a procedure to regain liberty
lost through criminal process cannot be made contingent upon a
choice of labels.
See also Daugharty v. Gladden, 2.57 F.2d 750 (9th Cir. 1958); Ex parte Chin
Loy You, 223 Fed. 883, 888 (D. Mass. 1915).
23. By relying on the "proceedings against" language in Powell, the instant court overlooked the possibility that "due process" (under Gideon)
might require the appointment of counsel when the convicted indigent, facing execution, petitions for certiorari. See note 37 infra. Moreover, the instant court failed to meet the "equal protection" argument upon which the
Court apparently based its holding in Douglas. Although the Douglas Court
specifically declined to extend its holding beyond the first appeal, it logically follows that the indigent should have the assistance of counsel at
certiorari to satisfy the same "equal protection" requirement of the fourteenth amendment.
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creased burden that appointment of counsel would place on the
state.24 In arguing that appointing counsel at certiorari would
greatly increase the number of such petitions, the court failed to
recognize that the main cause of overcrowded dockets is the excessive number of non-meritorious appeals'-the work of pro se petitioners and "jail-house lawyers."2 Appointment of counsel would
help solve this problem by eliminating frivolous appeals while
accentuating those that were meritorious. First, such counsel
would thoroughly investigate the petitioner's contentions to
determine their validity. 7 If these claims were found to be frivolous, counsel would report his findings to the defendant and the
court and thereafter refrain from proceeding with the appeal.2
24. Instant case at 460.
25. Mr. Justice Clark, dissenting in Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353
(1963), said "we all know that the overwhelming percentage of in forma
pauperis appeals are frivolous. Statistics of this Court show that over 00%
of the petitions filed here are of this variety." Id. at 358.
26.

You mean those pieces of paper written by semi-literate men? Or the
papers prepared with the advice of "jailhouse lawyers" who, for a carton of cigarettes, will file anything, anywhere? Are these "lawyers"
the appropriate guardians of the Constitution and the Great Writ?
Does it come down to this?
Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Dialogue On "The Most Pervasive Right" of an Accused, 30 U. Cm. L. Rv.
1, 26 (1962); see McElwain, The Business of the Supreme Court as Conducted by Chief Justice Hughes, 63 IHARv. L. REv. 5, 21 n.31 (1949).
27. See Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674, 675 (1958); People v. Brown,
55 Cal. 2d 64, 73-74, 857 P.2d 1072, 1077-79 (1960) (Traynor, J., concurring).
28. Douglas, read broadly, may require the indigent's attorney to make
the best available argument on appeal in all cases. Since the rich man's
lawyer probably would not withdraw from the case when he discovered
little or no merit in an appeal because his client's affluence gave him nothing to lose, "fourteenth amendment equality," see note 19 supra, may require the indigent's counsel to perform the strict role of an advocate too.
However, Douglas need not be read this broadly; that case can be interpreted as stating that due process requires merely a measure of equality.
Cf. Willcox & Bloustein, The Griffin Case- Poverty and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 48 CoRNmLL L.Q. 1, 22 (1957). Douglas may be saying that
equal protection is met when the indigent is given rights equal to the average defendant who retains his own counsel. As the average defendant,
having been informed that his appeal has little or no chance of succeeding, would probably decide not to appeal because of the prohibitive costs
involved, it does not seem unjust for the same result to be reached in the
case of an indigent, even though appointed counsel makes the decision. If
an appeal contains no merit, it should not be permitted to waste the courts'
valuable time. An appointed counsel can make this determination and still
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In this manner, the number of non-meritorious appeals actually
prosecuted would be greatly decreased 9 and the defendant's right
to counsel would be satisfied3 0 Second, appointed counsel would
presumably reveal the hidden merit in appeals that often goes
unobserved due to the inability of the petitioner or his "jailhouse"
lawyer to recognize or legally express it s l Since an appellate
proceeding, especially the petition for certiorari, requires a legally
trained mind even more than the trial proceeding, the need for
counsel to assist the petitioner in disclosing the merit is greater at
this level. 2
The inference from the instant court's holding, that acquiesbe an advocate. See Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674 (1958); People
v. Brown, 55 Cal. 2d 64, 73-74, 357 P.2d 1072, 1077-79 (1900) (Traynor,
J., concurring); Beaney, The Right to Counse" Past, Present, and Future,
49 VA. L. Rnv. 1150, 1158 n.35 (1968). This is not to say that the indigent whose appointed counsel has retired -from the appeal is automatically
denied access to the appellate tribunal. If he insists on making his appeal,
he can do so pro se; otherwise, the defendant's right to due process may
be violated. See Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963).
29. See BROWNEnL, LEGAL Am IN THE UNIx
STATES 145 (1951).
30. See note 28 supra.
31. For a graphic example of the need for counsel at certiorari, see
Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574 (1960). The Supreme Court agreed that Parker
had been convicted of a felony in disregard of his constitutional right to
counsel, but by the time his case was heard in the Supreme Court he had
served his sentence and the claim was moot. Parker's first petition to the
Supreme Court, years earlier, failed to reveal the prejudice that he encountered at the trial. Id. at 581 n.6.
32. See Boskey, supra note 8, at 797; Comment, 1959 DuEm L.J. 484,
488; of. People v. Breslin, 4 N.Y.2d 73, 78, 149 NE.2d 85, 88, 172 N.Y.S.2d
157, 161 (1958). Arguably, the pro se petition is not as great a handicap
to the petitioner at certiorari as it would be on his first appeal, because
in the Supreme Court the petition is reviewed by nine Justices and their
clerks, assisted by the trial transcript and the lower court briefs, before
its merit is determined. Contra, Brown v. Allen, 844 U.S. 443, 521 (1953)
(separate opinion). The ordinary petitioner-the defendant who, with legal assistance, is able to prosecute a petition that meets with the Court's
requirements and presents the Court with an intelligent record of his casehas a substantially better chance to have his petition granted. During the
1950 Supreme Court Term, while 15.2% of the "ordinary" petitions for
certiorari were granted, only 4.2% of the in forma pauperis petitions were
granted. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 521 (1953). In the 1961 Term, moreover, only 38 of 1093 in forma paupers petitions for certiorari were granted
(3.4%). Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 358 n.1 (1963). Thus, the
present increase in cases before the Supreme Court coupled with its practice of disposing of many of these petitions on their face, Douglas v. California, supra at 359, suggests that the appointment of counsel at certiorari
is a necessity.
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cence in the petitioner's claim would result in the augmentation
of present court expenses, is unfounded, because costs allocated to
provide counsel would be offset by a decrease in the expenditures
now made necessary by pro se petitions. The administrative expenses incurred by appellate courts in dealing with petitioners'
motions to appeal in forma pauperis, for assignment of counsel,
and for free transcripts and trial records, would be eliminated.
Furthermore, the time and costs encountered by the prosecution
in answering, and by the Court in holding hearings on and making
dispositions of, frivolous appeals would be significantly decreased.
There would also be a reduction in the substantial costs resulting
from the necessity of transporting the prisoner, under guard,
to the district where he was convicted in order to prosecute his
frivolous appeal.13 Finally, by providing the indigent with counsel
at every phase of his defense, it would become increasingly
difficult for him, the higher he goes on appeal, to assert a meritorious claim on which to base the appeal-there would be less
chance that reversible error or a valid constitutional claim would
go unnoticed in the lower courts. 4 The ultimate result would be
a reduction in all post-conviction and collateral proceedings and
the attributable expenses.
Finally, there remain the questions of when and by whom
counsel should be appointed to prepare the petition for certiorari.
The court in the instant case reasoned that since the petition for
certiorari was addressed to the Supreme Court, that Court should
assign counsel. The instant court, however, ignored the fact that
certiorari is included in the concept of state remedies. 8 The state
should assume the responsibility of providing the indigent with
counsel for certiorari because at this stage of the appeal the state
has had all of the substantial contacts with the defendant. Furthermore, the state initiated the action resulting in the conviction
and it must assume the responsibility of caring for dependents
surviving the defendant and the defendant himself if his sentence
is imprisonment.
The singular task of the petition for certiorari, as pointed out
by the Douglas Court, 30 is to illuminate the merit of the petitioner's case so that the Supreme Court will grant the writ. To appoint
counsel only after the Court has acknowledged the merit is of no
33. See United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 217 n.25 (1952).
34. Ehrenhaft, Indigent Appellants in the Federal Courts, 46 A.B.A.J.
646, 648 (1960).
35. See Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950).
36. 372 U.S. 353, 356 (1963).
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consolation to the convicted indigent whose meritorious pro se
petition was denied because of his inability to reveal a substantial
claim. A shroud of unfairness will continue to envelop this area
of the right to counsel so long as the state, while expending public
funds for its prosecution, denies those funds to the indigent
defendant, or, at the very least, the execution-bound defendant,3
and thereby deprives him of a chance to show the merit in his
case.

Labor Law: Non-Struck Employers' Lockout
To Counter Whipsaw Strike
Not Unfair Labor Practice
Respondents, non-struck members of a multi-employer bargaining association, locked out1 their employees and hired tern37. The stakes are infinitely higher where a man's life is hanging in the
balance, and it is arguable on a practical basis, although not on a constitutional basis, that the prisoner facing death has a greater "need" for
counsel. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in Grifln v. Illinois, 851 Us.
12 (1956), said that "since capital offenses are sui generis, a state may take
account of the irrevocability of death by allowing appeals in capital cases
and not others." Id. at 21. See also Wilcox & Bloustein, supra note 28,
at 13, in which the authors said that "to prescribe special privileges for
a defendant charged with a capital offense is traditional and reasonable,
and does not violate equal protection." Moreover, a recent article has indicated that the Court, due to its decisions in two recent capital cases,
White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963) and Hamilton v. Alabama, 368
US. 52 (1961), may continue to distinguish between capital and noncapital cases where determining the right to assigned counsel at pre-trial proceedings. The authors emphasized that the Court in both Wdte and Hamilton made special note of the fact that the case involved a capital criminal
and that the White decision was handed down after Gideon v. Wainwright.
Kamisar & Choper, supra note 16, at 58. If such a distinction exists at
pre-trial proceedings, it logically might prevail in post-conviction proceedings
as well, based, perhaps, on a prerequisite showing of "special circumstances,"
according to the Powell and Betts doctrine.
1. A "lockout" has been defined as "an employer's action in temporarily
shutting down his plant and temporarily laying off his employees during
a labor dispute." LRX LAB. REL. REP. 530 (1963). See generally Koretz,
Legality of the Lockout, 4 SmAcusE L. REv. 251, 252 (1953); Note, 50
CoLum. L. REv. 1123 (1950). At common law a lockout was defined as the
"cessation of the furnishing of work to employees in an effort to get for
the employer more desirable terms." Iron Moulders Union v. Allis-Chalmers
Co., 166 Fed. 45, 52 (7th Cir. 1908). See also GREoRy & KATz, LAnon LAv
147-48 (1948); ummis & MouloEiRaY, ORGANIZED LABoR 554 (1945); WEDsTER's NEW Wonmi DIcnoNARY 860 (1957).
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porary replacements to counter a "whipsaw" strike2 against another member who had already replaced the strikers. Upon a
complaint initiated by the locked-out employees' union, the National Labor Relations Board found that the lockout coupled
with the hiring of replacements by non-struck employers was
an unfair labor practice under sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of
the National Labor Relations Act.' On petition the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit denied enforcement of the Board's
order,4 holding that absent indicia of an intent to discriminate
against locked-out employees, non-struck members of a multiemployer bargaining association may operate with temporary
replacements for the duration of a strike. NLRB v. Brown, 319
F.2d 7 (10th Cir. 1963).5
The National Labor Relations Act was designed to reduce
industrial strife that impeded the normal flow of interstate
2. "Whipsawing" is the process of initiating successive strikes against
members of a multi-employer association. The technique often enables powerful unions to impose unilateral terms on the weakest member of an employer unit and, occasionally, to extend the terms to all the members. NLRB
v. Brown, 319 F.2d 7, 9 n.3 (10th Cir. 1963).
3. The relevant provisions of § 8 are:
8(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer (1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed in § 7 of this act;
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment
or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization:
Section 7 guarantees that
employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection ....
National Labor Relations Act §§ 7, 8(a)(1), (3), 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(1), (3) (1958).
4. The NLRB had ordered the respondents to cease and desist from
discouraging union membership by locking out employees so as to improve
their bargaining position while continuing to operate their establishments
and from similar interference with employee rights enumerated in § 7 of
the NLRA, quoted note 3 supra. The Board had also ordered the respondents
to reimburse each locked-out employee for lost wages. Brown Food Store,
137 N.L.R.B. 73, 82-83 (1962).
5. Petition for cert. filed, 32 U.S.L. WEEK 3155 (U.S. Oct. 16, 1903)

(No. 588).
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commerce;" accordingly, Congress sought to promote free collective bargaining7 by guaranteeing to employees the right of
self-organization. 8 To protect this employee right, section 8(a)
of the NLRA proscribes certain employer activity: Specifically,
section 8(a)(1) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with employees in the exercise of their guaranteed right to organize and bargain collectively, while section
8(a) (3) supplements section 8(a) (1) by prohibiting discriminatory
employment practices aimed at discouraging employee organizational activity.
The language of the unfair practice provisions of section 8(a)
is broadly proscriptive, however, not all lockouts are violative
'Retaliatory" lockouts- those intended to frustrate organiza6. DAYmn, THE ScoPE, or CoL.acrm BA.AM-WnG 1 (1951); Daykin,

Origin and Function of Labor Legislation, in

LGAL IssuEs n LABoR RELA-

TIONS 7, 17 (1961).

7. The "Short Title and Declaration of Policy" of the NLRA plainly
shows that Congress was concerned with advancing the "normal flow of
commerce" by promoting the process of collective bargaining.
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do
not possess full freedom of association . . . and employers who are
organized ... substantially burdens and affects the flow of commerce
Experience has proven that protection by law of the right of employees to organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from
injury, impairment, or interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain recognized sources of industrial strife ....
"Findings and Declaration of Policy," National Labor Relations Act § 1,

61 Stat. 136-37 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1958).
8. See National Labor Relations Act § 7, 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended,
209 U.S.C. § 157 (1958), quoted note 3 supra.
9. The legislative history of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat.
449 (1935) indicates that there was no intent to prohibit strikes or lockouts per se. See, e.g., 79 CoNG. REc. 7673-74 (1935) (remarks of Senator
Walsh). Moreover, the use of the term "lockout" in several sections of
the NLRA implies that in some instances employers may resort to the
lockout as a legitimate economic weapon. 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(d)(4).(1958) (no resort to "strike or lockout" during a 60-day notice
period); 61 Stat. 158--54 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 173(c) (1958) (Director of Mediation
Service to induce parties to settle disputes without resort to strike, lockout, or other coercion); 61 Stat. 155 (1947), 29 U..C. § 176 (1958) (appointment of board of inquiry by President when threatened by actual strike
or lockout). See HR. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 21-22, 70, 82
(1947); S. REP. No. 105, pt. 2, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1947); HR. Co,%r.
REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 34-35 (1947).
Lockouts were condoned at common law as a legitimate employer activity. See Goldman v. Cohen, 222 App. Div. 631, 227 N.Y. Supp. 311
(1st Dept. 1928); Dubinsky v. Blue Dale Dress Co., 162 Ms. 177, 292
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tional efforts" or prevent employee participation in lawful union
activities"- have been prohibited by both the Board and the
courts; and yet, "economic" lockouts - those instituted solely
for business reasons - have generally been upheld, 12 being
viewed primarily as a legitimate employer effort to mitigate the
impact of a strike on his business. 3 In contrast, single-employer
"bargaining" lockouts, which are designed to enhance an employer's bargaining position, have been commonly condemned
N.Y. Supp. 898 (Sup. Ct. 1936). See also Annot., 173 A.L.R. 674 (1948).
The common-law lockout was essentially a corollary of the employees'
right to strike, see Iron Moulders Union v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 166 Fed.
45, 50 (7th Cir. 1908), but whether these rights are corollary under the
NLRA is unsettled, see NLRB v. Truck Drivers Union, 353 U.S. 87 (1957)
(reserved decision); NLRB v. Dalton Brick & Tile Corp., 301 F.2d 886
(5th Cir. 1962) (refused to consider the question in absolute terms). Compare Morand Bros. Beverage Co. v. NLRB, 204 F.2d 529 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 909 (1953) (corollary), with Utah Plumbing & Heating
Contractors Ass'n v. NLRB, 294 F.2d 165 (10th Cir. 1961), and Quaker
State Oil Ref. Corp. v. NLRB, 270 F.2d 40 (8d Cir.), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 917 (1959).
10. See, e.g., NLRB v. Norma Mining Corp., 206 F.2d 38 (4th Cir. 1953);
NLRB v. Somerset Classics, 193 F.2d 618 (2d Cir. 1952); NLRB v. Cowell
Portland Cement Co., 148 F.2d 237 (9th Cir. 1945).
11. See, e.g., Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945)
(lockouts prohibited if they tend to discourage union membership); NLRB
v. Piedmont Cotton Mills, 179 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1950); Seaboard Diecasting Corp., 137 N.L.R.B. 536 (1962); NLRB v. Port Gibson Veneer &
Box Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 319 (1946), enforced as modified, 167 F.2d 144 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 819 (1948).
The existence of a proscribed motive may be inferred from conduct preceding the lockout that indicates hostility toward the union. See, e.g., Atlas
Underwear Co. v. NLRB, 116 F.2d 1020 (6th Cir. 1941); NLRB v. National Motor Bearing Co., 105 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1939); Sifers Candy Co.,
75 N.L.R.B. 296 (1947), enforced, 171 F.2d 63 (10th Cir. 1948); Pepsi-Cola
Bottling Co., 72 N.L.R.B. 601 (1947); Meltzer, Single-Employer and MultiEmployer Lockouts Under the Taft-Hdrtley Act, 24 U. Cii. L. REV. 70 (1956).
12. See, e.g., American Brake Shoe Co. v. NLRB, 244 F.2d 489 (7th Cir.
1957) (loss on work in process and imminent probability of permanent loss
of business justified lockout); International Shoe Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 907 (1951)
(cessation of operations upheld where sporadic strikes interfered with efficient operation of integrated departments); Duluth Bottling Ass'n, 48 NJLII.B.
1335 (1943) (lockout to prevent spoilage of materials upheld); BrownMcClaren Mfg. Co., 34 N.L.R.B. 984 (1941) (lockout upheld where utilized
to take advantage of more profitable business site).
Economic conditions unrelated to negotiations may also justify a shutdown of operations or a specific portion of operations. NLIRB v. Houston
Chronicle Pub. Co., 211 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1954); NLRB v. Goodyear Footwear Corp., 186 F.2d 913 (7th Cir. 1951).
13. Meltzer, supra note 11, at 72.
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by the NLRB. 4 Single-employer lockouts, however, are distinguishable from defensive lockouts utilized by members of a multiemployer bargaining association: '" The former represent an action
14. See, e.g., Morand Bros. Beverage Co., 91 N.LjLB. 409, 412-13 (1950),
remanded, 190 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1951); Morand Bros. Beverage Co., 99
N.JRMB. 1448, 1460-66 (1952), enforced, 204 Fad 529 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 909 (1953).
The Supreme Court has not squarely ruled on the validity of "bargaining" lockouts. See NLRB v. Truck Drivers Union, 353 U.S. 87 (1957), 57
COLUm. L. Rtv. 1172, in which the Court expressly reserved the question
of the legality of the bargaining lockout utilized by a single employer. But
cf. NLRB v. Dalton Brick & Tile Corp., 301 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1062), 47
IfMfNN. L. Rsv. 915 (1963), in which a single-employer lockout during negotiations was upheld in the absence of a showing of economic necessity as
neither discrimination nor a violation of a specific provision of the NLRA
was shown.
15. While the single-employer unit represents bargaining by a single plant
or by more than one plant under a common management, the multi-employer bargaining unit is commonly characterized by either form type contracts, which are identical agreements signed by different employers, or by
contracts in which employers jointly participate in contract negotiations
without being members of any formal association. By far the most prevalent of all the types of multi-employer bargaining is association bargaining,
which is carried on by groups of employers combining for the purpose of
negotiating contracts with labor unions. The association may range from an
organization which meets only during contract negotiations to an elaborate
organization with a constitution, by-laws, and a regular staff of officers. One
analysis of collective bargaining agreements shows that approximately as
many as five million workers are involved in multi-employer bargaining. U.S.
BuREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DE"T OF LABOR, (Rep. No. 1) (1953).
Multi-employer bargaining associations long antedated the ISLRA in industries characterized by numerous employers of small work forces and a
rapid turnover of employees. Usually the smaller employers feel the need of
concerted action to match the power of a strong union. However, pressures
exerted on large corporations may lead them to consider the possibility of
combining in a bargaining association. Multi-employer bargaining has had
its greatest expansion since the enactment of the NLRB because employers
have sought to match increased union strength by group bargaining. CnvaBERLAN, CozxcI=T
BARGAINING 178-79, 180-82 (1951).
The NLRB sanctioned multi-employer bargaining units as early as 1938,
4 NLRB AwN. RP'. 92-93 (1939), and the legislative history of the NILRA
indicates that proposals made to limit or outlaw multi-employer bargaining were met with the protest that their adoption would weaken the collective bargaining process and conflict with the policy of promoting industrial peace through effective collective bargaining. Hearings on S. 5 Before
Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 8Oth Cong., 1st Sess. 421-28,
1012-17, 1032-37, 1055-57, 1162-65, 2018-19, 2310-11 (19.17); Hearings on
HR. 8 Before House Committee on Education and Labor, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess. 552-53, 1552-54, 3024-26 (1947); 93 CONG. Rnc. 1834-35 (remarks of
Senator Morse), 4030-31 (remarks of Senator Murray), 4442-14 (remarks of
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initiated by the employer in an attempt to break a bargaining
impasse, while the latter typically constitute a concerted employer
response to a whipsaw strike."6 "Defensive" lockouts have been
upheld by the NTRB,'1 7 and in NLRB v. Truck Drivers Union18
the Supreme Court firmly established their validity.
In the instant case, the NLRB acceded that a bare lockout
might have been validly "defensive" but determined that the
hiring of fill-in workers rendered the instant lockout "retaliatory."
The Board recognized that a "whipsaw" strike results in a competitive edge for the non-struck over the struck employers, which
tends to disintegrate the multi-employer bargaining unit unless
non-struck employers are permitted to lock out their regular workers. By operating with fill-ins, however, the Board reasoned that
the respondents had enhanced their bargaining position, thereby
Senator Ball), 4501-07 (remarks of Senator McCarran), 4674-76 (remarks
of Senators Taft and Morse) (1947). See also HALL, Impact of the Bargaining Unit an Labor-Management Relations, PROCEEDINGS OF 2D ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABoR 29 (1959); Note, The NLRB and Multi-Employer Units
in a Competitive Economy, 43 ILL. L. REv. 877 (1949).
16. See Note, The Multiemployer Lockout, 20 U. Cm. L. Rv. 299 (1953).
Initially, the NLRB drew no distinctions between multi-employer defensive and single-employer bargaining lockouts and its position against singleemployer lockouts was first developed in cases involving multi-employer
defensive lockouts. See Morand Bros. Beverage Co., 99 N.L.R.B. 1448
(1952), enforced, 204 F.2d 529 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 909 (1958).
See also Rothman, Four Areas of Developing Law - Resume and Rationale,
NLRB Press Release, 43-45, Feb. 15, 1963.
17. NLRB v. Continental Baking Co., 221 F.2d 427 (8th Cir. 1955);
NLRB v. Spaulding Avery Lumber Co., 220 F.2d 673 (8th Cir. 1956).
The various distinctions between different kinds of lockouts have been
criticized by writers in the field of labor law as arbitrary and artificial. See,
e.g., Koretz, supra note 1. Professor Koretz argues that the anti-union or
retaliatory lockout and the economic lockout should not be distinguished
because anti-unionism is usually based on economic considerations; instead,
the legality of a particular lockout should be decided by balancing the conficting legal rights of the parties. See also Meltzer, Lockouts Under the
LMRA, 28 U. CHI. L. REv. 621 (1961). There is some tendency on the part
of the courts to use the terms interchangeably. Thus, in NLRB v. Truck
Drivers Union, 353 U.S. 87 (1957), the Court seems to equate defensive
and economic lockouts in the multi-employer situation. The Court stated
that a strike by employees against one member of a multi-employer unit
constituted a threat of strike action against all of the employers and that
such a threat constitutes the type of economic or operative problem which
legally justifies their resort to a temporary lockout of employees.
18. 353 U.S. 87 (1957). The Court upheld the multi-employer lockout as
a valid exercise of the employers' right to protect their common interest in
bargaining as a unit.

CASE COMMENTS
unfairly discriminating against their employees. 19 NLRB v. Truck
Drivers Union was factually distinguished, since the Truck
Drivers Union struck employer chose not to operate with interim
workers," which necessitated a lockout by non-struck employers
to preserve the bargaining unit. Where the struck employer has
replaced the strikers, however, the non-struck employer can operate with his regular employees and a lockout inferrably is intended
solely to inhibit a lawful strike, a violation of sections 8(a)(1)
and (3).
In refusing to grant enforcement, the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit interpreted Truck Drivers Union, basically, as permitting employer self-help to preserve the bargaining equality of
multi-employers3' On this basis the instant court sustained both
the lockout and the hiring of fill-ins.22 reasoning that, clearly, if
19. The Board's decision was not premised on a finding of the respondents' unlawful motivation. See Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. NLRB, 352
U.S. 1020 (1957) (change in employer policy giving preference to nonstrikers
and to employees who had returned to work during the strike held discriminatory in violation of §§ 8(a)(1), (3) ). Rather, the Board based its finding of discrimination on respondents' course of conduct in hiring replacements. NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 132 NL.TR.B. 621 (1961), enforcement
denied sub nom. International Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 303 F.2d
359 (3d Cir. 1962) (discriminatory intent on the part of an employer may
be shown by specific intent or by conduct carrying an indicia of unlawful
intent).
20. A struck employer may replace strikers in order to preserve his business. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.. 333 (1938).
21. There is on one hand the right of employees to strike, threaten to
strike, or support a strike of their fellow union members by legal means,
NLRB v. Peter Cailler Kohler Co., 130 Fad 503, 505-00 (2d Cir. 1942),
and on the other hand, there is the right of the employer to preserve or
maintain his business operations in the face of employee pressures, NLRB
v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956); NLRB v. Mackay
Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.. 333 (1938).
22. In a dissenting opinion in the instant case, Mr. Justice Murrah argued
that the balancing of interests of employers and employees had been entrusted to the NLRB by Congress and under previous decisions it was not
within the judicial prerogative of the court of appeals t6 set aside the
Board's decision. Instant case at 12. The basic judicial review provisions
in the amended NLRA are found in §§ 10(e), (f). 61 Stat. 147 (1947), 29
U.S.C. §§ 160(e), (f) (1958). It seems clear that the courts do have the
power to set aside Board decisions, NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960); S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 26-27
(1947); see Universal Camera Co. v. NLRB, 340 US. 474 (1951); Koretz,
The Lockout Revhisted, 7 SmAcusE L. Rnv. 263 (1956), and in practice,
the courts have frequently had occasion to do so, see, e.g., NLRB v. Truck
Drivers Union, 353 U.S. 87 (1957); NLRB v. Continental Baking Co., 221
Fad 427 (8th Cir. 1955).
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the struck employer shuts down, the other employers could lock
out their employees and, thus, if the struck employer then replaced the strikers, the non-struck employers who had locked out
their employees could likewise hire fill-ins. 3 Therefore, the NLRB
had denied the multi-employers an effective defensive lockout
by requiring them to retain their own employees in order to
remain operative. 24 This approach might suggest an underlying
hypothesis that a multi-employer association must operate as
a single employer to be effective; 25 the instant court impliedly
rejects this, however, stating that the locked-out employees did
not acquire the status of actual strikers. Such language would
also seem to indicate that if the replacements had been permanent
rather than temporary,26 the lockout would not have been
upheld. A permanent severance of employment, then, evidently
exceeds the necessities of the multi-employers "defensive" lockout, whereas a temporary severance caused by a lockout and
rehiring is presumably commensurate with the union-initiated
whipsaw strike.
The decision in the instant case seems to effectuate the NLRA
policy of aiding efficacious collective bargaining by preserving
multi-employer associations. A struck employer always may replace strikers2 8 or make unilateral changes in employment conditions, 29 however, because of numerous practical difficulties, these
remedies alone do not effectively protect the multi-employer association. For example, the union may use the financial resources
of the membership of the multi-employer association to support
a strike against a single employer, possibly culminating in the
23. The court believed that to deny the struck employer the right to replace that was guaranteed by Mackay, see note 19 supra, would allow the
union to obtain a privileged position by virtue of its whipsaw tactics.
24. The court's reference to lockouts as a privilege rather than a right
may indicate that it is following the rationale of the court in NLRB v.
Dalton Brick & Tile Corp., 301 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1962), 47 Mi'N. L. Rsv.
915 (1963). In Dalton the court stated that the right to lockout is conditional and that each case must be considered in its own setting.
25. 16 NLRB ANN. REP. 176 (1951). A number of writers in the field
of labor law have adopted this view. See, e.g., Jones, The NLRB and the
A'ultiemployer Unit, 5 LAB. L.J. 34 (1954).
26. Morand Bros. Beverage Co., 99 N.L.R.B. 1448, 1460 (1952), enforced,
204 F.2d 529 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 909 (1953).
27. For a thorough discussion of the discharge-lockout and permanenttemporary severance distinctions, see Petro, The NLRB on Lockouts I, 3
LAB. L.J. 739 (1952).
28. NTLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345 (1938).
29. Davis Furniture Co. v. NLRB, 100 N.L.R.B. 1016 (1952) (dictum).
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withdrawal of the struck member from the multi-employer unitO0
Similarly, the individual employer may encounter difficulties in
attempting to institute unilateral changes in employment following an impasse. The employer has no assurance that such action
will avert a strike timed in accordance with union tactics, and
individual concessions by an employer without securing his demands or the withdrawal of union demands may interfere with
the process of future negotiations between the union and the
multi-employer association. Finally, unilateral concessions may
suggest to the union that more will be forthcoming following a
strike. Thus, the individual employer's limited control over employment terms seems an ineffectual substitute for a concerted
employer response in the form of a lockout and rehiring!"
Furthermore, the whipsaw strike allows unions to exert nearly
as much pressure against non-struck employers as against those
employers actually struck. If the union is protected against a lockout and replacement of employees by non-struck employers, it
may initiate such strikes with few of the deterrent risks of ordinary strike action! 2 To deny employers the right to lockout and
replace employees not only deprives employers of the benefit of
concerted action when they most need it, but also permits the
union to derive the advantages of bargaining with a larger unit
while retaining the option to abandon such bargaining by the use
of selective strikes. This ability to temporarily fragment the larger
unit seems to involve a denial of the premise behind the recognition of the propriety of multi-employer bargaining - the existence
of a community of interest among employers.
By neutralizing the effectiveness of whipsaw strikes while balancing the legitimate interests of the parties, the instant case
represents an attempt to advance the collective bargaining
process. Since the members of an employer bargaining association
are considered as a unit for purposes of collective bargaining, it
seems only proper that the economic weapons available to one
member of the group should be available to the group as a unit.
Moreover, the union presumably anticipated bargaining with the
association as a whole. A unified response in the form of a joint
lockout and employee replacement, therefore, is consistent with
the reasonable expectations of unions and employers consenting
to operate within the framework of multi-employer bargaining. 3
30. Kerr &Fisher, Midtiple Employer Bargaining: The San, Francisco ExiNTO LABOR ISSUES 25, 30 (Lester & Shuster ed. 1948).

perience, in INsIGHTs

31. Meltzer, supra note 11.
32. Koretz, supra note 1, at 272.

33. Meltzer, supra note 11. It has been argued that allowing non-struck
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Zoning Law: "eFutile" Pursuit of

Local Remedies Unnecessary To
Challenge Validity of Use Restriction
The city of Chicago ordered plaintiff to discontinue multiple
family occupancy of property zoned for single family use.' When
plaintiff failed to observe this order, the city commanded her to
appear before a compliance board and threatened to bring suit
if she disobeyed the earlier directives. Without previously seeking
local relief,2 plaintiff brought an action for a declaratory judgment that the ordinance classifying her property for single family
members of a multi-employer group to lock out and rehire workers would
turn every "single" employer strike into a multi-employer effort and increase the time lost to strikes. However, a field study has shown that where
such defensive lockouts were allowed, there were fewer large strikes and the
time lost remained the same or declined. Kerr & Fisher, supra note 30, at
53. In any case, the "time lost on strikes is only one of the dimensions of
the strike problem; the extent to which the time lost is concentrated at a
particular time in a particular industry is the principal other dimension."
Lewis, The Labor-Monopoly Problem: A Positive Program, LIX J. POL.
EcoN. 277, 279 (1951). Furthermore, the concentration of lost time is accepted as a cost of the existing pattern of industrial relations when produced
by simultaneous strikes.
1. The property was restricted to single family occupancy by the Chicago
Zoning Ordinance of April 5, 1923. The 1923 Ordinance was superseded, in
turn, by the zoning ordinances of December 3, 1942 and of May 29, 1957.
The 1942 and 1957 ordinances continued the restriction of the subject
property to single family occupancy. CHicAGO, ILL,., MuxNin'iAL CODn ch.
194A; Brief for Appellant, pp. 11, 56, Westfield v. City of Chicago, 26 Ill.
2d 526, 187 N.E.2d 208 (1962). Multiple family use of the property was
commenced by one of plaintiff's predecessors in title in 1948.
The subject property was also located within the Hyde Park-Kenwood
Urban Renewal District, established by the Chicago City Council under the
authority of federal and state legislation in November, 1958. A "conservation board," created under this urban renewal plan, was empowered to recommend to the city council the zoning or rezoning that it thought was required for the district. At the time the instant case was decided, the board
had recommended continued restriction of the subject property to single
family occupancy. Id., p. 11.
2. Amendment of the zoning ordinance was the only form of local relief
available to plaintiff, because the Chicago Zoning Ordinance prohibited the
granting of "use" variations. Zoning Ordinance of 1957, CHIcAao, ILL., MuNICIPiAL CODE ch. 194A, art. 11.7-4. See Babcock, The New Chicago Zoning
Ordinance, 52 Nw. U.L. REV. 174, 195 (1957); Lawton, Procedural Implications of Recent Zoning Decisions, 40 Cm. B. REc. 15, 17 (1958). The same
section of the City and Village Zoning Enabling Act that deprives the councils of cities with populations in excess of 500,000 (the City of Chicago
presently is the only municipality in this category) of the power to grant
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occupancy was void as to that property. The trial court gave
judgment for plaintiff, permitting her to continue to use the property for multiple family occupancy although subject to the restrictions imposed by the zoning ordinance on that classification
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed and held that plaintiff was
not required to exhaust her local remedies before initiating legal
action because it was "apparent" that the pursuit of local relief
would be futile and that the zoning ordinance as applied to
plaintiff's property was "unreasonable and confiscatory" and
hence void. Westfield v. City of Chicago,26 Ill. 2d 526,187 NXE.2d
208 (1962).
With respect to the exhaustion of local remedies problem, the
instant case is among the progeny of Bright v. City of Evanston
In Bright the Illinois Supreme Court established that a property
owner may not judicially challenge the validity of a zoning ordinance, as applied to his property5 without first exhausting his
administrative remedies. Judicially developed procedures such
as that of the Bright case have been generally supported. Zoning
is fundamentally a legislative function, and therefore, to allow
zoning authorities the opportunity for discretionary and flexible
development of zoning regulations in advance of judicial determinations of their validity is desirable By adhering to the Bright
rule, courts are partially able to avoid the difficult task of applying
both "use" and "bulk" variations and vests that power in zoning boards
of appeals also expressly recognizes that local zoning ordinances may forbid
the granting of "use" variations by the boards of appeals. hLu. R V. STAT.
ch. 24, § 11-13--4 (1961).

3. For a discussion of the implications of the court's reclassification of
the subject property, see note 9 infra and accompanying text.
4. 10 Ill. 2d 178, 189 N.B.2d 270 (1956).
5. Id. at 186, 189 NM.E2d at 274. The court distinguished those cases
where the ordinance as a whole is alleged unconstitutionally to impair the
value of property or destroy its marketability and stated that in the latter
situation direct judicial relief may be afforded without prior resort to remedies under the ordinance. Id. at 184-85, 189 NXE.2d at 274. The propriety
of using this distinction as a criterion for requiring the exhaustion of local
remedies prior to seeking judicial relief was recognized by the United States
Supreme Court in its landmark decision upholding the constitutionality of
land-use zoning. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 US. 305, 380
(1926). Nonetheless, its significance in the context of modem zoning litigation has recently been questioned. Babcock, The Unhappy State of Zoning
Administration in Illinois, 26 U. Cm. L. REV. 509, 523-24 (1959).
6. See, e.g., Herman v. Village of Hillside, 15 Ill. 2d 396, 155 N.E.2d
47 (1958); Bank of Lyons v. County of Cook, 13 Ill. 2d 493, 150 NX.2d
97 (1958); Bright v. City of Evanston, 10 Ill. 2d 178, 139 N.E.2d 270 (1956);
Dowsey v. Village of Kensington, 257 N.Y. 221, 177 N.E. 427 (1931).
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a constitutional standard to a multiplicity of local fact questions;7
in fact, it has been said that the Illinois Supreme Court's primary
goal in following the Bright rule is "to cut down the number of
zoning cases it must decide."" Also, by requiring property owners
to exhaust their local remedies before initiating legal action, the
courts will be able to avoid in many cases the problem of substituting new classifications where existing classifications would be
found invalid. Unless a court is willing and able' to substitute a
new classification for the old, it will be limited to either upholding
the classification or declaring it invalid as to that property, thereby
leaving the use of the property unrestricted. This problem can be
avoided if property owners are required to apply first for local
relief since conditions of future use would then be subject to control by the local zoning authorities. 10
Since the Bright decision, the Illinois court has determined
that the rule therein established is inapplicable where the pursuit
of local remedies would apparently be futile; but the standard of
"futility" has been somewhat unsettled.-" In the instant case, the
court found that any efforts by plaintiff to obtain local relief
would have been futile because the zoning restriction had been
incorporated into an exhaustively planned and studied urban
7. 1 RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING 37-6 (3d ed. 1950);
Babcock, supra note 5, at 532--34. See also La Salle Nat'l Bank v. County
2d 40, 49, 145 N.E.2d 65, 70 (1957) (dissenting opinion).
of Cook, 12 Ill.
8. Babcock, supra note 5, at 532.
9. The Illinois Supreme Court has pursued a somewhat tortuous course of
decision with respect to the question of a court's power to substitute a new
zoning classification for one that it finds invalid. Compare National Brick
2d 191, 197, 137 N.E.2d 494, 497 (1956), and
Co. v. County of Lake, 9 Ill.
2d 253, 258, 122 N.E.2d
La Salle Nat'l Bank v. City of Chicago, 4 Ill.
519, 522 (1954), with Sinclair Pipe Line Co. v. Village of Richton Park,
19 I1. 2d 370, 167 N.E.2d 406 (1960).
The question was not presented to the court by counsel in the instant
case, although the trial court had not limited itself to invalidating the
existing restriction, but had gone on to substitute for it plaintiff's proposed
alternative classification. Instant case at 533, 187 N.E.2d at 212. To the
extent that this reflects acceptance of Sinclair, it indicates that Bright may
not be justified in Illinois on the ground that it is needed to minimize the
occasions when judicial action invalidates a zoning restriction without substituting a more reasonable one, but only on the grounds of administrative and judicial convenience and orderliness.
10. City of South Bend v. Marckle, 215 Ind. 75, 18 N.E.2d 764 (1939);
Finn v. Township of Wayne, 53 N.J. Super. 405, 412 (App. Div. 1959).
2d 493, 150 N.E.2d
11. Compare Bank of Lyons v. County of Cook, 13 Ill.
97 (1958), with County of Lake v. MacNeal, 24 II. 2d 523, 181 N.E.2d 85
2d 396, 155 N.E.2d 47 (1958).
(1962), and Herman v. Village of Hillside, 15 Ill.
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renewal project, the city had demanded plaintiff's compliance with
the restriction, and the city had threatened to bring suit against
plaintiff if she continued to violate the restriction.
The determination of futility in the instant case -and the
reliance on it as the basis for exempting plaintiff from the Bright
rule'2- seems incorrect. Futility was inferred from acts of the
zoning administrator rather than from acts of the municipal council or the board of zoning appeals. The views of the zoning administrator, however, need not necessarily accord with those of
the council or board on the granting of local relief. Thus, the fact
that the administrator threatens, or even brings, suit is no assurance that the council or board will fail to grant relief.13
Basically, the Bright procedure appears to be a desirable advance in zoning administration. The rule assumes, however, that
local zoning bodies are qualified and that they have established
uniform procedural standards. 14 The tendency of the Illinois court,
evinced in the instant case, to distinguish cases applying Bright
because the futility of seeking local remedies in the given case is
"apparent" may reflect judicial suspicion that the assumed qualifications and procedural standards are absent. Nevertheless, strict
application of the Bright rule might constitute an effective stimulus to reform the rules and procedures of zoning administration. 15
'A valid zoning restriction, as an exercise of the state's police
'12. As an original matter one might also argue that the Bright rule is inapplicable to the instant case on the ground that the rule requires the exhaustion only of local administrative remedies, while an amendment (the only local
relief available to plaintiff in the instant case) constitutes legislative action.
The Illinois court strongly intimated the validity of such a distinction in
Eckhardt v. City of Des Plaines, 13 Ill. 2d 562, 150 N.E2d 621 (1958). However, in Reilly v. City of Chicago, 24 Ill. 2d 348, 181 NE.2d 175 (1902), decided eight months before the instant case, the court held that the term
"administrative remedy," as used in Bright, encompassed appropriate and
available local relief generally, whether legislative or administrative. It said
that the requirement of seeking local relief is justified on grounds of administrative and judicial convenience, whether the relief in question is granted by a
board of appeals or by a legislative body and whether denominated an amendment or a variation. The Eckhardt case was not cited.
. 13. Even if it were assumed in the instant case that the orders and threats
of the City Building Department reflected the views of the city council with
respect to amending the ordinance, the instant case appears to conflict with
Basik of Lyons v. County of Cook, 13 IlL 2d 493, 150 NX.E.d 97 (1958).
14. Babcock, supranote 5, at 534.
15. For an imaginative proposal for administrative reform through the
creation of a state-wide zoning commission with the powers to establish uniform rules and procedures for local zoning bodies and to hear appeals from the
final rulings of those bodies, see Babcock, supra note 5, at 538-41.
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power, 16 must have some substantial relationship to the health,

safety, morals, order, and general welfare of the community; and
the power of the community to zone must be exercised reasonably

and not arbitrarily.' 7 Involved in applying the constitutional test
is a balancing of public and private interests: May the harm to
the public that is avoided by the restriction be reasonably conceived to outweigh the hardship thereby imposed on the individual property owner'18
In the instant case, the Illinois Supreme Court considered the
validity of the zoning ordinance, as applied to the subject property, in light of the above test. The court found that enforcement
16. It has long been established that the general classification and regulation of land use upon a broader basis than nuisance is constitutional. Village
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); City of Aurora v. Burns,
819 Ill.
84, 149 N.E. 784 (1925).
17. Wallace, Legal ConsiderationsIncident to Zoning, in ZoNiNa AvMimN-

(Campbell ed. 1954).
18. City of Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co., 147 Fla. 480, 8 So. 2d 364
(1941); Miller Bros. Lumber Co. v. City of Chicago, 414 I1. 162, 111 N.E.2d
149 (1953); Neef v. City of Springfield, 380 Ill.
275, 280-81, 43 NXE.2d 947,
950 (1942).
The test is stated in terms of the avoidance of harm rather than the conferral of benefit. The purpose of this distinction is to separate those cases
where the purpose and effect of governmental restriction may be realized
through regulation under the police power and those where the exercise of
eminent domain and payment of compensation are required. Applying the
distinction to land-use zoning,
the benefit resulting from elimination of a harm does not result from
any particular land use; the benefit results from non-use in a particular
way rather than from any of the permissible uses. On the other hand
the benefit resulting from a restriction designed to obtain a benefit most
often can result only from the one or more permitted uses.
Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis for City Planning (Making Room for
Robdrt Moses, William Zeckendorf, and a City Planner in the Same Community), 58 COLum. L. REv. 650, 664-5 (1958). See also FREUND, Tnn POLIC,
PowER § 511 (1904); Dunham, City Planning:An Analysis of the Content of
the Master Plan, 1 J3. & EcoN. 170, 179-82 (1958). The distinction seems implicitly to have been applied in two Illinois cases. See Galt v. County of Cook,
405 InI. 396, 91 N.E.2d 395 (1950); 2700 Irving Park Bldg. Corp. v. City of
Chicago, 395 Ill.
138, 69 N.E.2d 827 (1946). It seems clear in the instant case
that the city, in restricting the subject property to single family occupancy,
was attempting to avoid a public harm rather than confer a public benefit.
Municipal policy would have been just as satisfactorily achieved whether, as a
result of the zoning restriction, the subject property consisted of a vacant lot
or a single family residence. Thus, assuming the validity of the distinction
between conferral of benefit and avoidance of harm, the restriction in the
instant case involves the latter. Therefore, it is not invalid per se as a taking of
private property for public use without just compensation. Its validity depends rather on a weighing of public harm against private burden.
TRATION AND ENroncRMMNT 2, 3
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of the zoning ordinance would work a "real and substantial" economic hardship on the plaintiff, in the form of a capital loss if she
sold the property and an income loss if she retained it. With the
exception of a vague phrase elsewhere in the opinion,19 however,
the court devoted but one short paragraph to an examination of
the public interest. 0 The sole question examined was whether
multiple family occupancy of the subject property had resulted
in any diminution in neighboring property values. The court found
no proof of such an effect. Weighing the private hardship against
the apparent absence of public benefit, the court concluded that
the ordinance was unreasonable and confiscatory and therefore
void as applied to plaintiff's property.
. Whether, in dealing so summarily with the public interest, the
court intended to deny recognition to measurements of public
interest other than diminution of neighboring property values is
not clear from the opinion. The court did recognize that the comprehensive study and planning involved in the creation of an
urban renewal district should be a factor in determining the
validity of zoning regulations?' Yet it failed to indicate in what
manner this factor should be considered and specifically denied
the city's contention that judicial review of zoning based upon
the recommendation of a conservation board is substantially
more limited than the2- review of zoning that is unrelated to an
urban renewal district.
Single family dwelling districts should be established under com19. See text accompanying note 21 infra.
20. Instant case at 532, 187 NE.2d at 212.
21. Id. at 530, 187 NE.2d at 211.
22. Ibid.At the time the instant case was decided, the Hyde Park-Kenwood
Conservation Board's "proposed" zoning maps had not yet been adopted
by the city council; the maps did, however, propose continued restriction of
the subject property to single family occupancy. Brief for Appellant, p. 35. The
city contended that to overcome the presumption of validity of the proposed
zoning classification under the urban renewal plan, plaintiff would have to
show that the plan, as distinguished from the proposed zoning restriction, "was
fraudulent or capricious, clearly evasive or contrary to constitutional prohibitions." Id., p. 44. The court noted that the city had evidently confused the
validity of the plan and of its provision for the exercise of eminent domain
with that of the zoning restriction. Instant case at 530, 187 NX.2d at 211.
This confusion apparently resulted from the city's feeling that the trial court,
in holding invalid the zoning restriction proposed by the conservation board,
had "indirectly" held the urban renewal plan itself invalid. See Brief for
Appellant, p. 41.
It is difficult to comprehend why the existence of an urban renewal district
should affect the adjudication of zoning controversies other than possibly to
make available to the court greater factual material concerning the area in
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prehensive zoning ordinances, 2 since the public policies sought
to be achieved through such districts are many and varied. 4 The
establishment of such districts, however, is not properly justified
by a desire to protect surrounding "property values" or the "character of the neighborhood"; these two factors are "derivative" in
the sense that they merely reflect the presence of one or more primary factors that may or may not provide a valid basis for zoning
restrictions.2 5 In considering such districts, the courts recognize
that the drawing of zoning district boundary lines must always be
more or less arbitrary, because the properties on either side of a
line cannot differ substantially. 20 In the instant case the city eswhich the subject property is located. Conceivably the city might show that,
although plaintiff's violating use had not heretofore harmed the public, continued violation would have a deleterious effect upon new uses to be introduced under the conservation plan. Yet this situation would be essentially
that present in any newly developing area. It has been held that municipalities
may employ the zoning power to protect anticipated future uses in new areas
as well as current uses in established areas. See People v. Johnson, 129 Cal.
App. 2d 1, 277 P.2d 45 (1954); Napierkowski v. Township of Gloucester, 29
N.J. 481, 150 A.2d 481 (1959); Gignoux v. Village of Kings Point, 199 Misc.
485, 99 N.Y.S.2d 280 (Sup. Ct. 1950). Certainly the fact that a purpose of
urban renewal may be to expand the availability of single family residences
is not itself sufficient justification to zone property in the district for that
use. Such a restriction would clearly violate any rule based upon a distinction
between conferral of benefit and avoidance of harm. See note 18 supra.
23. Miller v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 Pac. 381 (1925);
Jacobson v. Village of Wilnette, 403 Ill. 250, 85 N.E.2d 753 (1949); Dc Bartolo
v. Village of Oak Park, 396 Ill. 404, 71 N.E.2d 693 (1947); Wulfsohn v. Burden, 241 N.Y. 288, 150 N.E. 120 (1925).
24. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394-95
(1926); Johnson v. City of Huntsville, 249 Ala. 36,29 So. 2d 342 (1947); Sullivan
v. Anglo-American Inv. Trust, Inc., 89 N.H. 112, 193 Atl. 225 (1937); 8
McQuiL iN, MuNicmiAL ComoRAToNs § 25.101 (3d ed. 1957). An exhaustive
list and analysis of the principal aims of residential land-use control (including
zoning ordinances) appears in Williams, Planning Law and Democratic Living,
20 LAw & CONTE1m. PRoB. 317, 331-S4 (1955). Of the factors listed, those
which bear upon the instant case are (1) protection against heavy traffic; (2)
protection against noise and congestion arising from the presence and movement of large numbers of people; and (3) protection against aesthetically displeasing sights.
25. Williams, supra note 24, at 333-34. In the instant case the court found
no evidence that invalidation of the restriction upon plaintiff's property
would adversely affect surrounding property values and did not consider any
possible effect upon the character of the neighborhood. The court seemed
tacitly to assume that lack of effect upon the derivative indicates lack of effect
upon the primary. Hence it did not go beneath the derivatives to consider
whether any of the primary factors justified the restriction in question.
26. See, e.g., In re Dawson, 136 Okla. 113, 115-16, 277 Pac. 226, 228
(1929). The Illinois court had recognized before the instant case that the
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sentially argued that the gain to the public interest from restricting the subject property to single family occupancy was the promotion of safety and the security of home life, by preventing the
deterioration of the properties and community in plaintiff's area. -7
While there had admittedly been no proof that neighboring property values had depreciated as a result of the multiple family use
of plaintiff's property, the city emphasized that the use of single
family structures for multiple family purposes would initiate the
deterioration of the entire community, not just the property within the same block. It asserted that the monetary depreciation
would be "immeasurable" when the interests of the entire community were affected, as in the instant case?8
The difficulty with the city's position was that it had not shown
that any of the evils cited had in fact occurred or were likely to
occur in the instant case. 9 It was dearly unable to prove that
such evils had been reflected in a diminution of property values in
the surrounding area: 30 there were adequate parking facilities on
the subject property; the city admitted that the condition of the
house, both inside and out, was good; and it could hardly argue
that light and air in the neighborhood was adversely affected by
the multiple family use of the property. The city's strongest argudrawing of zoning classification boundary lines necessarily will affect property
owners on either side of the line somewhat arbitrarily. The court emphasized,
however, that the drawing of boundary lines is a legislative function and that
the proximity of a boundary line does not per se render the restrictions upon
property in a more restricted district unreasonable or invalid. Elmhurst Nat'l
Bank v. City of Chicago, 22 11. 2d 396, 405, 176 N.E.2d 771, 775 (1901);
Wesemann v. Village of La Grange Park, 407 I1. 81, 89, 94 NXE.2d 904, 909

(1950).

27. Brief for Appellant, pp. 60-63.
28. Petition for Rehearing, p. 7.
29. Cf. People ex rel. Larsen & Co. v. City of Chicago, 24 Ill. 2d 15, 179
N.E.2d 676 (1962).
So. It should be noted that the conclusion of the court with respect to
diminution of neighboring property values apparently does not exclude the
possibility that, but for plaintiff's violation of the ordinance, neighboring
property values would have risen since 1948. Neither the briefs nor the opinion
contain any information on this point. It would seem, however, that preventing
such a rise would be a public harm in the same sense as causing a decline.
Either effect should satisfy the test discussed in note 18 supra.
Of course, even had the city been able to prove in this fashion that the
purpose and effect of the restriction as applied to plaintiff's property was to
avoid (or, in this case, to rectify) a public harm which was within the municipal power to prevent, rather than confer a public benefit, it would still have
had to show that the public harm avoided (or rectified) outweighed any resultant burden upon plaintiff. See note 18 supra.
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ment was that if multiple family occupancy of plaintiff's property
were permitted, there would be no reason to deny such use of other
property in the single family district. The result, it was argued,
might eventually be the elimination of the single family district.
Plaintiff attempted to answer this argument by demonstrating
that while it might be applicable elsewhere, it was not applicable
in the instant case. s ' She contended essentially that since her property was surrounded on three sides by educational, religious, and
charitable institutions, the burden of the ordinance on the property owner was greater, and its benefit to the public was less, in
her case than would be the case in other parts of the single family
district.2
Assuming that surrounding property values have been neither
diminished nor prevented from rising3 3 by the multiple family use
of plaintiff's property in the past and that they will not be
so affected by plaintiff's continued multiple family use in the
future, it would appear that neighboring owners of properties
zoned for single family use could not rely on plaintiff's multiple
family use as a ground for rezoning their own properties.3 4
They would be required to show that multiple family use
of their own properties would not depreciate surrounding property values more than it would contribute to their own. In the
likely event that their properties were not surrounded on three
sides by non-single family uses, they might well encounter more
difficulty in demonstrating a lack of public interest in enforcing
the single family classification against their properties than did
plaintiff in the instant case.
31. Brief for Appellee, pp. 29-30.

32. Two authorities on zoning law, relying upon their personal knowledge
of Chicago, have argued that the adverse impact of poorly maintained multi-

ple family dwellings in the blocks south of the subject property upon the
latter's value as a single family dwelling was an important element in the
decision of the instant case. See Babcock & Bosselman, Suburban Zoning and

the Apartment Boom, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 1040, 1066 n.183 (1963). The difficulty with their argument is that if the effect of this factor were felt so dis-

tantly, it is hard to see why the owners of the single family dwellings lying
immediately north of the subject property might not rely upon the same factor

to have the zoning ordinance declared invalid as to their properties.
33. See note 30 supra.
34. The failure of their property values to be adversely affected by plaintiff's non-conforming use may well indicate that none of the primary factors
that might justify restriction of plaintiff's property to single family occupancy

was present. See notes 24 &25 supra.

